Foreign Dictators in U.S. Court
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It’s almost impossible to sue a foreign government in U.S. courts. The Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, the court-created “act of state” doctrine, and other common-law immunities shield foreign officials and governments from most lawsuits.
For instance, courts have dismissed claims against China, Cuba, Venezuela, and
Russia over allegations of torture, detentions, and election interference. Yet foreign
governments have unfettered access to U.S. courts as plaintiffs. And foreign dictatorships—including Russia, China, Turkey, and Venezuela—have leveraged this access to harass political dissidents, critics, and even newspapers in the United States.
These doctrines create an asymmetry at the heart of this Article: foreign dictators
and their proxies can access our courts as plaintiffs to harass their opponents, but
their regimes are, in turn, immune from lawsuits here.
This Article exposes that asymmetry and argues that U.S. courts and Congress
should make it harder for foreign dictators to abuse our legal system. This Article
offers three novel contributions. First, this Article provides the first systematic assessment of foreign dictatorships in U.S. courts. While much of the literature is siloed by area of substantive law—focusing on contexts like human rights or property
expropriations—this Article treats dictators as a transsubstantive category of litigants, worthy of special analysis. Second, this Article exposes how foreign dictators
are increasingly taking advantage of U.S. courts and comity doctrines, especially as
plaintiffs. In a misguided effort to promote harmonious foreign relations, courts
have provided foreign dictators an array of protections and privileges, which dictators are eagerly exploiting. Finally, this Article demonstrates that there is no historical, constitutional, or statutory obligation on U.S. courts to give foreign dictators
these legal protections and unfettered access to our courts. Because of that, I offer
four concrete proposals to both stymie dictators’ access to U.S. courts as plaintiffs—
through a proposed foreign sovereign anti-SLAPP statute—and weaken the protections that dictators enjoy as defendants. Simply stated, U.S. courts should not be
instruments of foreign authoritarian oppression.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2018, the Chinese Communist Party launched a “multidimensional ‘legal war’” against Chinese corruption suspects in the
United States, filing a flurry of meritless lawsuits to harass political targets and force them to return to China.1 Chinese officials
have indicated that these lawsuits are manufactured to drain defendants’ financial resources.2 Between 2013 and 2019, Turkey’s
and Russia’s authoritarian governments used proxy plaintiffs to
file claims in U.S. court against dissidents and exiled politicians,
including a major Turkish political figure, Muhammed Fethullah
Gülen, who lives in Pennsylvania.3 Turkey’s lawyer claimed that
the lawsuit “represent[ed] a . . . political battle” that would show
that the defendant’s movement was “not untouchable in the
United States.”4 These lawsuits are part of global harassment
campaigns, leading a judge to call one of the Russian cases a “blatant misuse of the federal forum.”5 Venezuela’s autocratic regime
has also recently litigated several cases against its opponents,
forcing U.S. courts to decide whether Nicolás Maduro is still that
country’s president.6 Though they vary on the specifics, these
cases involve foreign dictatorships filing frivolous claims in U.S.
courts to pursue political ends, harass dissidents, and strengthen
their rule. And these cases are the least of it.7
1
See Aruna Viswanatha & Kate O’Keeffe, China’s New Tool to Chase Down Fugitives:
American Courts, WALL ST. J. (July 29, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-corruption
-president-xi-communist-party-fugitives-california-lawsuits-us-courts-11596032112.
2
See id.
3
See Humeyra Pamuk, Foe of Turkish President Erdogan Slapped with U.S. Lawsuit,
REUTERS (Dec. 9, 2015), https://perma.cc/JC3F-XF5F; ANDERS ÅSLUND, ATL. COUNCIL,
RUSSIA’S INTERFERENCE IN THE US JUDICIARY 24–27 (2018), https://perma.cc/9RVS-32UZ;
see, e.g., Ateş v. Gülen, No. 15-CV-2354, 2016 WL 3568190, at *1 (M.D. Pa. June 29, 2016);
Smagin v. Yegiazaryan, 733 F. App’x 393, 394 (9th Cir. 2018).
4
Motion for Rule 11 at 3, 13, Ateş, 2016 WL 3568190 (No. 15-CV-2354) (quotation
marks omitted).
5
Avilon Auto. Grp. v. Leontiev, No. 656007/16, 2017 WL 4422593, at *4 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Oct. 05, 2017), rev’d, 91 N.Y.S.3d 379 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019).
6
See Jiménez v. Palacios, 250 A.3d 814, 819–20 (Del. Ch. 2019), aff’d, 237 A.3d 68
(Del. 2020); Jef Feeley, Juan Guaido Asks U.S. Judge to End Maduro Bid to Appoint
PDVSA Board, BNN BLOOMBERG (July 18, 2019), https://perma.cc/BKD5-GN4D.
7
Dictatorships sometimes come up in different strands of legal literature. One
strand focuses on the relationship between international law and authoritarian governments. See, e.g., Tom Ginsburg, Authoritarian International Law?, 114 AM. J. INT’L L. 221,
225–28, 231 (2020). Most of the literature, however, is siloed by substantive area, focusing
on contexts like human rights or property expropriations claims. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley
& Jack L. Goldsmith, Pinochet and International Human Rights Litigation, 97 MICH. L.
REV. 2129, 2161–64 (1999) (discussing the inapplicability of customary international law
to claims of head-of-state immunity). Further afield, a recent paper explores the
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It turns out that dictators as plaintiffs have been litigating a
wide variety of civil claims in U.S. courts for decades. From Mao
Zedong’s fight with the Kuomintang in a 1952 Northern District
of California case8 to Fidel Castro’s 1964 attempt to enforce expropriations in the Southern District of New York,9 dictators have
become a recognizable presence in U.S. courts. Indeed, the history of
these claims traces back to a canonical 1867 case that involved, in
the words of the Supreme Court, the “right of the French Emperor
to sue in our courts.”10 That case recognized the “privilege of
bringing suit,” which allows foreign sovereigns to sue in U.S.
court for any reason.11 Although rooted in that 1867 decision, the
privilege has mostly slipped under the radar of the academic literature.12 But recent cases filed by Venezuela, Turkey, Russia,
and China involving claims against dissidents, U.S. newspapers,
and critics should raise new questions about the privilege’s foundations and continued operation.13
While the phenomenon of dictators as plaintiffs in political
cases is problematic on its own, the issue is compounded by a series of foreign relations doctrines that shield foreign dictators as
defendants. From Ferdinand Marcos14 and Augusto Pinochet to
Manuel Noriega15 and Jiang Zemin,16 dictators have also faced
claims as defendants in U.S. courts, ranging from cases over property stored in the United States to tort, human rights, breach of
contract, sanctions, and other run-of-the-mill lawsuits. Recently,
application of laws from authoritarian countries in run-of-the-mill U.S. cases. Mark Jia,
Illiberal Law in American Courts, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 1685, 1691, 1694–1701 (2020). This
Article is the first to take a comprehensive and transsubstantive view—treating dictatorship cases as a distinct category—and to focus on the interaction of domestic law, the judiciary, and foreign dictators as litigants in U.S. courts.
8
Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Tr. Co., 104 F. Supp. 59, 60–61 (N.D.
Cal. 1952), aff’d, 209 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1953).
9
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401–08 (1964).
10 The Sapphire, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 164, 167 (1870).
11 See id. at 167–68; Hannah L. Buxbaum, Foreign Governments as Plaintiffs in U.S.
Courts and the Case Against “Judicial Imperialism”, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 653, 660
(2016); Zachary D. Clopton, Diagonal Public Enforcement, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1077, 1092–
93 (2018).
12 One of the only papers to directly address the privilege is Buxbaum, supra note 11,
at 660.
13 See, e.g., Cabello-Rondón v. Dow Jones & Co., No. 16-CV-3346, 2017 WL 3531551,
at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2017), aff’d, 720 F. App’x 87 (2d Cir. 2018).
14 See Hilao v. Est. of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 771 (9th Cir. 1996) (seeking damages for
alleged human rights abuses perpetrated by Marcos).
15 See United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1997).
16 See Wei Ye v. Jiang Zemin, 383 F.3d 620, 622 (7th Cir. 2004) (seeking damages for
alleged human rights abuses perpetrated by Zemin).
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the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) recognized the importance
of these cases through the Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative
(KARI).17 Congress responded to that initiative by passing a bill
in 2021 that expanded the program to the Department of the
Treasury.18 Congress itself periodically strips foreign regimes of
sovereign immunity and most recently did so in the 2016 Justice
Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act19 (JASTA), which permitted
civil claims against states that support terrorism.20 Presently,
there are cases pending in U.S. courts against Venezuela, Turkey,
Russia, and China concerning actions by their respective dictatorships, including seizures of assets, torts by Turkish officials in
Washington, D.C., and Russian cyberattacks in the 2016 election.21
Even though authoritarian regimes have unfettered access to
U.S. courts as plaintiffs, they can avoid liability as defendants by
drawing on a series of foreign relations doctrines that give special
protections to foreign sovereigns.22 For example, the court-created
act of state doctrine instructs that U.S. courts cannot judge the
validity of foreign sovereign acts performed in the foreign country’s territory, even if authoritarian acts—like expropriation, political persecution, and torture—violate U.S. law and public policy.23 This doctrine has shielded Cuba, China, Russia, and
Venezuela from legal claims.24 Dictators as defendants can also
draw on unduly expansive readings of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 197625 (FSIA) and related common-law immunities that bar plaintiffs from suing sovereigns in U.S. court.26 Just
17 See Leslie Wayne, Wanted by U.S.: The Stolen Millions of Despots and Crooked
Elites, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2016), https://perma.cc/5Z5N-VKK4.
18 Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Rewards Act, Pub. L. No 116-283, 134 Stat. 4834 (2021).
19 Pub. L. No. 114-222, 130 Stat. 852 (2016) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605B).
20 See Jess Bravin, Lawyers Move Quickly After Congress Enacts Bill Allowing Suits
Against Saudi Arabia, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 30, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/lawyers
-in-9-11-cases-plan-to-ask-that-saudi-arabia-be-added-as-defendant-1475270658.
21 See Usoyan v. Republic of Turkey, 438 F. Supp. 3d 1, 7–10 (D.D.C. 2020), aff’d, 6
F.4th 31 (D.C. Cir. 2021); United States v. Zeese, 437 F. Supp. 3d 86, 91–92 (D.D.C. 2020);
Complaint at 2–7, Dem. Nat’l Comm. v. Russian Federation, 2018 WL 1885868 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 20, 2018) (No. 18-cv-3501) (dismissed in 2019); Missouri ex rel. Schmitt v. People’s
Republic of China, No. 20-CV-99, 2021 WL 1889857, at *3 (E.D. Mo. May 11, 2021).
22 For a sampling of the literature, see, for example, Chimène I. Keitner, Adjudicating Acts of State, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 49, 50–53
(John Norton Moore ed., 2013).
23 See John Harrison, The American Act of State Doctrine, 47 GEO. J. INT’L L. 507,
533–37 (2016).
24 See infra Part I.D.
25 Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602–1611).
26 For a comprehensive history of immunity in U.S. courts, see generally THEODORE
R. GIUTTARI, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY (1970). See also G. Edward
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recently, for instance, the Supreme Court decided a Nazi expropriations case against Germany based on a narrow reading of an
exception to the FSIA.27 Similarly, courts have dismissed cyberespionage cases against Russia and Ethiopia under the FSIA even
though the statute allows suits when a foreign nation commits a
tort in the United States.28
These doctrines create the problematic asymmetry at the
heart of this Article: foreign dictators and their proxies can access
our courts as plaintiffs to harass their opponents, but their regimes are, in turn, usually immune from lawsuits here. For example, in 2016, a top-ranking Venezuelan official sued the Wall
Street Journal for defamation over an article linking him with
drug trafficking.29 But if the Wall Street Journal had tried to sue
a Venezuelan official for harassment of its journalists, the case
would likely have been dismissed under common-law immunities.30 Our legal system, then, seems to insulate dictators from the
downsides of U.S. law while allowing them to reap the benefits of
access to court. This asymmetry makes foreign sovereigns—and
specifically foreign dictators who are willing to exploit access to
U.S. courts—a unique kind of litigant, worthy of special attention.
In this Article, I argue that U.S. courts and Congress should
remedy this asymmetry and make it harder for foreign dictators
to take advantage of our legal system. The premise underlying
the argument is simple: U.S. courts should not serve the interests
of foreign dictatorships if they can avoid it. Liberal theorists from
Karl Popper to John Rawls have defended a democracy’s right to
resist having its institutions employed for illiberal purposes.31 Indeed, under a Kantian view of international law, democracies are
not obligated to extend comity to tyrannical states “[b]ecause dictators do not represent their people, [so] they cannot create

White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign Relations, 85 VA. L.
REV. 1, 27–28, 134–45 (1999).
27 Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp, 141 S. Ct. 703, 712–13, 715 (2021); see
also Republic of Hungary v. Simon, 141 S. Ct. 691, 691 (2021) (per curiam).
28 See Sam Kleiner & Lee Wolosky, Time for a Cyber-Attack Exception to the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, JUST SEC. (Aug. 14, 2019), https://perma.cc/4EZB-87AN; Doe v.
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 851 F.3d 7, 11–12 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
29 See Cabello-Rondón, 2017 WL 3531551, at *1.
30 Although the doctrine of foreign official immunity is currently in flux. See Samantar
v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 325–36 (2010).
31 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 216–18 (1971); KARL POPPER, THE OPEN
SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES 368 (new one-vol. ed. 1995); see also Karl Loewenstein, Militant
Democracy and Fundamental Rights, II, 31 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 638, 650–51 (1937); Samuel
Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1405, 1459 (2007).
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obligations for their subjects.”32 Without necessarily embracing
that view, the problem is that the foreign relations doctrines mentioned above—the privilege of bringing suit, act of state, FSIA,
and related immunities—benefit all sovereigns equally, including
those governed by dictatorships.33 So then the question becomes
whether domestic law requires extending comity to foreign dictators. If it does not, courts can and should discard it.
The privileges afforded to dictatorships are partly rooted in
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,34 where the Supreme Court
allowed Fidel Castro’s government to file suit in U.S. court and to
benefit from U.S. comity doctrines.35 The Court explicitly rejected
the argument that Cuba “should be denied access to American
courts because Cuba is an unfriendly power and does not permit
nationals of this country to obtain relief in its courts.”36 Sabbatino
rested on two pillars: the potential harm on the nation’s foreign
relations and the difficulty of assessing which foreign regimes deserve different treatment.37 By treating Cuba’s dictatorial regime
like any other sovereign (democracy or not), Sabbatino reinforced
a principle that courts have repeatedly recognized—an equaltreatment principle for all regime types—and it allowed the comity doctrines to flourish in this context.
In Part II of this Article, I argue that Sabbatino and the comity doctrines rest on shaky premises because there is no obligation
on U.S. courts—statutory, constitutional, or otherwise—to treat
foreign dictators equally to other sovereign litigants. Although
courts worry about the separation of powers and the foreign affairs consequences of judging foreign dictators, there is no convincing evidence that these cases have presented difficulties in
the past.38 Indeed, anticomity doctrines, U.S. statutes on state
32 See Fernando R. Tesón, The Kantian Theory of International Law, 92 COLUM. L.
REV. 53, 89 (1992); Anne-Marie Burley, Law Among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalism and the Act of State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1907, 1930–32 (1992); IMMANUEL
KANT, To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, in PERPETUAL PEACE AND OTHER
ESSAYS 107 (Ted Humphrey trans., 1983); Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to
Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 46, 47 (1992). But see BRAD ROTH, SOVEREIGN
EQUALITY AND MORAL DISAGREEMENT: PREMISES OF A PLURALIST INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
ORDER 72–73 (2011) (rejecting the Kantian view of international law).
33 See Burley, supra note 32, at 1930–32; Roth, supra note 32, at 72–73.
34 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
35 Id. at 408–09.
36 Id. at 408.
37 Id. at 412.
38 One contested question here is courts’ role in developing the common law of foreign
relations, which has provoked heated debates. See Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common
Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1264–70, 1291–1311 (1996)
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sponsors of terrorism, and an international law doctrine on odious
debts explicitly allow U.S. courts to judge foreign countries or
regimes.39 Those cases suggest that U.S. courts can, and often do,
treat foreign dictatorships differently from democratic regimes without significant foreign affairs consequences. Moreover, Sabbatino
and its progeny are not fit for a world that is dealing with widespread democratic recession—which is so globalized that foreign
dictators can extend their tentacles into the United States.40
While U.S. courts could (and sometimes do) treat dictatorships differently than democratic regimes, Part III concludes that
there is no easy way for courts to administer a categorical antidictatorship standard. Even setting aside fundamental concerns
with separation of powers, dictatorships may not be the right
category to target. The problem with dictatorial acts is that they
fundamentally challenge basic human rights and liberties. But
democratic governments can do that too. That is why U.S. courts
have previously refused to enforce libel awards from the United
Kingdom.41 Judging all dictatorships as different than democratic
governments for purposes of all claims would also be substantively overinclusive. There is no need to prevent dictatorships
from litigating nonpolitical claims like contract disputes or embassy hit-and-run accidents.42
Lastly, forcing U.S. courts to distinguish between friendly and
unfriendly dictatorships, as well as among the different shades of
authoritarian governments (e.g., hybrid, semiauthoritarian, or
competitive authoritarian), would be unfeasible. Courts would even
have difficulty determining whether a foreign dictator is a U.S.
ally or rival. This problem is best captured by the apocryphal
(describing the debates); Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1632 (1997) (arguing that although the validity of the commonlaw nature of foreign relations is uncontested, its scope remains in flux); Curtis A. Bradley
& Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique
of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 860–62 (1997).
39 See infra Part I.
40 See
Christopher Walker, Dealing with Authoritarian Resurgence, in
AUTHORITARIANISM GOES GLOBAL: THE CHALLENGE TO DEMOCRACY 216, 217–22 (Larry
Diamond et al. eds., 2016); Mathew Burrows, The Long View on Authoritarianism’s Second
Wind, in IS AUTHORITARIANISM STAGING A COMEBACK? 3, 5–9 (Mathew Burrows & Maria
J. Stephan eds., 2015); Tom Ginsburg & Aziz Huq, How We Lost Constitutional Democracy,
in CAN IT HAPPEN HERE? AUTHORITARIANISM IN AMERICA 135, 141 (Cass R. Sunstein ed.,
2018); Valeriya Mechkova, Anna Lührmann & Staffan I. Lindberg, How Much Democratic
Backsliding?, 28 J. DEMOCRACY 162, 162–66 (2017).
41 See Bachchan v. India Abroad Publ’ns Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661, 664–65 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1992).
42 See infra notes 73–82 for an extended discussion of “political” cases.
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quotation attributed to President Franklin Roosevelt that Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza “may be a son of a bitch, but he’s
our son of a bitch.”43 As I discuss below, the complexity of U.S.
foreign policy is why doctrines like the political offense exception
to extradition are rooted in attempts to promote democracy but
are nonetheless neutral as to regime type.44
These problems make one conclusion clear: whatever rule we
create to discriminate against foreign dictatorships risks being
over- or underinclusive and difficult to administer.
Because of the aforementioned difficulties, Part IV of this
Article offers four prescriptions that avoid these problems. We
need not categorically judge foreign dictatorships qua dictatorships. Instead, courts and Congress can weaken the foreign relations doctrines in cases that disproportionately advantage foreign
dictatorships. To improve the dictators-as-plaintiffs side of the
asymmetry, the sovereign privilege of bringing suit should be subjected to the robust procedural protections of a new federal antiSLAPP statute so that defendants can quickly move to dismiss
political harassment claims filed by any sovereign—democracy or
dictatorship—or its proxy. Such a statute would bring the legitimacy of the political branches and would spare the judiciary
from categorically judging between different regime types. Importantly, such a statute is likely to enjoy bipartisan support, and
the proposal has already received national media coverage.45
To improve the dictators-as-defendants side of the asymmetry, courts should (1) narrow the act of state doctrine, (2) limit
the scope of foreign official immunity, and (3) interpret existing
FSIA exceptions broadly, allowing more claims against foreign
dictators. To be sure, to the extent that these changes apply
across the board, they will also impact democratic governments.
That means some of these solutions will be overinclusive. But, as
I discuss below, some of these suggestions are narrowly tailored
to influence mostly dictator cases.

43 Somoza’s son, another dictator, had cases in U.S. court. Robert Funk, He’s Our
Son of a Bitch, HUM. RTS. & HUM. WELFARE, https://perma.cc/59Q7-88EJ. See generally
Ope Shipping, Ltd. v. Allstate Ins., 521 F. Supp. 342 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff’d in part and
rev’d in part, 687 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1982). See also Toke S. Aidt & Facundo Albornoz,
Political Regimes and Foreign Intervention, 94 J. DEV. ECON. 192, 200 (2011) (discussing
various U.S. interventions aimed at consolidating autocracies abroad).
44 See infra Part II.B.
45 See Diego A. Zambrano, Foreign Tyranny by U.S. Lawsuit, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 2,
2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/foreign-tyranny-by-u-s-lawsuit-11599087161.
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The complete scale of harm to political dissidents and democracy is hard to grasp. Although we can identify dozens of claims
across U.S. courts, most cases likely remain hidden because authoritarian governments use proxies to file them.46 Moreover,
these claims may be most significant because of litigation’s
chilling effect on other dissidents and journalists. Even a single
claim sends a powerful message to would-be critics: no matter if
you are in the United States, we can bring our harassment to U.S.
courts. Take the case of Peng Xufeng, who claims he fled China
after he refused to testify against enemies of the Chinese Premier,
Xi Jinping.47 In response, Chinese officials allegedly harassed him
in California, smashed his windows, arrested his family in China,
moved his child to an orphanage, and, finally, used a state-owned
company to sue him in U.S. court.48 Or consider Xiao Jianming, a
Chinese businessman who fled to the United States.49 In 2019, a
Chinese state-owned company sued Xiao and his daughter in U.S.
courts, alleging that Xiao diverted to his daughter hundreds of
thousands of dollars in company funds.50 Facing this costly lawsuit, Xiao returned to China.51 Immediately thereafter, the company dismissed its U.S. claim and, simultaneously, a Chinese anticorruption entity called the Central Commission for Discipline
Inspection celebrated the success of the litigation pressure.52 Similar stories abound involving Russian and Venezuelan cases.
Beyond its focus on the doctrinal asymmetry, this Article addresses the need for a national reckoning with the United States’
cooperation with foreign autocrats—especially in the wake of
Jamal Khashoggi’s murder by agents of the Saudi Arabian government—and the recent rise of foreign autocracies.53 Despite a
longstanding scholarly debate on human rights, the legal literature has almost entirely overlooked the relationship between domestic law and foreign dictators. Yet, as more nations join the
bandwagon of illiberal authoritarianism, from Hungary to Poland,

46

See infra Part I.A.1.c.
See Viswanatha & O’Keeffe, supra note 1.
48 Id.
49 See id.
50 Id. See generally Complaint, Yuntinic Res., Inc. v. Jianming Xiao, No. 19CIV1868
(Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 2, 2019)
51 Viswanatha & O’Keeffe, supra note 1.
52 Id.
53 There are pending cases in U.S. courts against Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed
bin Salman. See William S. Dodge & Chimène I. Keitner, A Roadmap for Foreign Official
Immunity Cases in U.S. Courts, 90 FORDHAM L. REV. 677, 679, 697–98 (2021).
47
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Turkey to Venezuela, and Russia to Brazil, our legal system is
facing questions of how to treat these countries, their rulers, and
their sovereign interests.54 Foreign authoritarians have manipulated their own laws to stay in power and now seem to be doing
something similar in foreign courts. Even more, dictators also
take advantage of other U.S. institutions, including real estate
markets, banks, and social media. While this Article focuses on
the judiciary’s role in opposing illiberal foreign actors,55 it may be
that blunting foreign dictators’ access to our courts would disincentivize a larger pattern of conduct.
This Article pays other dividends for a variety of literatures.
Stepping back from the minutiae of these cases reveals that at
their core is the principle of international comity, a free-floating
ideal by which U.S. courts address questions involving foreign affairs. This principle is the subject of a rich literature, provoking
recent debates over its continued viability and force.56 Dictator
claims are deeply intertwined with international-comity-related
doctrines.57 By offering a deeper account of foreign dictators in U.S.
court, then, I seek to both influence courts’ handling of these cases
and also to enrich our understanding of international comity.58
Moreover, this Article discusses the possibility of party-specific
rules that offer unequal treatment,59 as well as the judiciary’s role
in foreign affairs.60 In one sense, this Article presents a case study
in the failures of foreign relations law to adapt to modern currents. We have a doctrinal landscape in which some of the
54 See generally Ingrid Wuerth, The Due Process and Other Constitutional Rights of
Foreign Nations, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 633 (2019) (arguing that foreign states are entitled
to certain due process rights under the Constitution).
55 See, e.g., SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN & RICHARD H. PILDES, THE LAW
OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 1453–57 (4th ed. 2012).
56 See, e.g., CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 4
(6th ed. 2017); Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1897, 1974–78 (2015); William S. Dodge, International Comity in American Law, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2214–24 (2015); Samuel Estreicher &
Thomas H. Lee, In Defense of International Comity, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 169, 173–77 (2020);
Maggie Gardner, Retiring Forum Non Conveniens, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 390, 423–27 (2017);
Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J.
1170, 1179–81 (2007).
57 For a sampling of the literature, see Keitner, supra note 22, at 50–61.
58 Courts’ interaction with executive power in this context is also the subject of a vast
literature. See, e.g., THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS, DOES
THE RULE OF LAW APPLY IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS? 100 (1992); HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE
NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR
147–48 (1990).
59 See Roger Michalski, Trans-personal Procedures, 47 CONN. L. REV. 321, 338–42 (2014).
60 See infra Part I.B.
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doctrines (like the act of state doctrine) are doing too much work
while, at the same time, entire problems (like the sovereign abuse
of U.S. courts) fall through the cracks.61 In Part III, I provide some
guidance on the future of foreign relations law.
The Article develops in four parts. Part I provides a definition
of foreign “dictatorships,” taxonomizes types of dictator cases, and
outlines specific problems with existing rules and doctrines. It
then unfolds with an investigation of dictator-related cases. While
international law is in the background of these cases, courts ultimately tend to focus on domestic doctrines. After this descriptive
account, Part II of this Article demonstrates that U.S. courts need
not treat dictatorships like regular litigants and have the power
to prevent politically vexatious litigation. Parts III and IV introduce an array of potential ways to indirectly handicap foreign
dictators in U.S. litigation.
I. FOREIGN DICTATORS IN U.S. COURT
In this Part, I introduce the phenomenon of foreign dictators
participating in U.S. litigation, focusing especially on the post–
World War II cases that have shaped international comity doctrines. Part I.A provides a snapshot of dictator-related suits,
categorized by (1) dictators as plaintiffs and (2) dictators as defendants as well as by the underlying substantive claims. Part I.B
then canvasses the history of these claims from the first monarchy-related cases in the nineteenth century to more recent
changes. The goal here is not to engage in a historical exegesis
but to instead briefly recapitulate the major cases that have
shaped our doctrines. Part I.C uses this history to provide a brief
survey of the relevant doctrines—privilege of bringing suit, act of
state, and related immunities—as they stand today. Finally,
Part I.D draws from this background—substantive claims, history, and doctrines—to focus on existing problems with dictator
cases.
Before that background, let’s first settle on terms and the
scope of the project. By foreign “dictator,” I am drawing on the
minimalist definition for an autocratic regime, encompassing any
instance when an executive gained power through “any means

61 Robin J. Effron, Doctrinal Redundancy and the Two Paradoxes of Personal Jurisdiction, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. ONLINE 117, 122–27 (2019).
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besides direct, reasonably fair, competitive elections.”62 This is an
admittedly loose use of the term because it encompasses authoritarian leaders that are part of vastly different regimes, from
formally competitive authoritarian systems, like Russia under
Vladimir Putin, all the way to royal autocracies like Saudi Arabia.
My main source of information is the popular Polity IV database,
which provides a comprehensive list of independent states between 1800 and 2017, coded by regime characteristics.63 The database specifically develops a score that tags regimes on a scale
from most democratic (+10) to most autocratic (⎯10).64 The sections below draw from this database, allowing me to run a methodical search of cases involving authoritarian leaders after
1945. In order to narrow down my search, I focused on twenty
recognizable dictators on the list.65
Even if we stipulate the meaning of “dictator,” we must also
define when a dictator is involved in civil litigation. In general, I
am interested in cases where a foreign dictatorship or its proxy is
in U.S. court for actions related to the dictatorship’s power. Those
actions can be personal to the dictator, but they can also be related to the dictatorial regime’s political interests. Sometimes dictators sue or are sued in their individual capacity while at other
times plaintiffs sue the state itself or an official.66 For example,
the Democratic National Committee (DNC) named Russia rather
than Putin as defendant in its suit over election interference and
hacking.67 Dictatorships can also be less individualistic and more
institutional, like the Chinese Communist Party.68 Of course, it

62 Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright & Erica Frantz, Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set, 12 PERSPS. ON POL. 313, 317 (2014).
63 See generally MONTY G. MARSHALL, TED ROBERT GURR & KEITH JAGGERS, CTR.
FOR SYSTEMIC PEACE, POLITY IV PROJECT: POLITICAL REGIME CHARACTERISTICS AND
TRANSITIONS, 1800-2017 DATASET USERS’ MANUAL (2018), https://perma.cc/23L2-VGDC.
64 I specifically focused on twenty dictators, see infra Appendix A, and I supplemented it with modern heads of state of countries that have shown clear signs of autocratic
backsliding, such as Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping, Nicolás Maduro, and Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan.
65 I compared my list with dictators mentioned in the New York Times archives, using frequency of mention as a proxy for public awareness of a given dictator. These mostly
overlapped, but I ignored a handful of the most-mentioned dictators.
66 See supra note 21; infra Appendix A.
67 See Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Russian Federation, No. 18-cv-3501, 2018 WL
1885868 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2018); see also Ingrid Wuerth, Russia Asserts Immunity in the
DNC Case, LAWFARE (Nov. 16, 2018), https://perma.cc/DBP4-E9NG.
68 See generally Manuel E. Delmestro, The Communist Party and the Law: An Outline of Formal and Less Formal Linkages Between the Ruling Party and Other Legal Institutions in the People’s Republic of China, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 681 (2010).
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would be problematic to tag every case by a foreign government
that happens to be dictatorial as a case involving a foreign dictator.
Thus, I use a definition that is both over- and underinclusive in
the following ways. On the one hand, I include some cases where
foreign dictators were involved indirectly in U.S. courts, either
through proxies or government lawyers. On the other hand, I include only cases where either (1) the foreign dictator is named in
any of the documents pertaining to the suit or (2) a foreign government or official appears to be litigating on behalf of the foreign
dictatorship or attempting to defend the regime’s interests. These
definitions are admittedly imperfect, but they do offer a narrow
lens through which to focus on the phenomenon that this Article
addresses.
A. Substantive Claims in Foreign Dictator Suits
The first landmark case involving a foreign autocrat was filed
in 1811, when two boat owners sought to reclaim a ship that, allegedly, was “violently and forcibly taken by certain persons, acting under the decrees and orders of Napoleon.”69 So began two
hundred years of interactions between our courts and foreign authoritarian governments. Looking specifically at post-1945 cases,
dictators have been common litigants in U.S. courts. Focusing on
just twenty dictators in the past few decades, there have been
more than one hundred cases across U.S. district courts. These
include names like Mao Zedong, Fidel Castro, Augusto Pinochet,
Ferdinand Marcos, and Saddam Hussein.70 Usually, the official
party named in the suit was the country’s government or an instrumentality like a central bank. More recently, official parties
tend to be proxies, lower-level officials, or cronies. For example,
the Chinese Communist Party has filed civil cases in U.S. courts
through proxy companies or agents to conceal its involvement in
political harassment lawsuits.71 But within China, officials have
explicitly acknowledged that they were responsible for the
claims.72 Cases included countries like Venezuela, Cuba, Iran, the
69

The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 117 (1812).
My list of dictators also included: Vladimir Putin, Manuel Noriega, Hugo Chávez,
Nicolás Maduro, Shah Mohammed Reza, Anastasio “Tachito” Somoza Debayle, Marcos
Pérez Jiménez, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Pol Pot, François Duvalier, Jean-Claude Duvalier,
Lee Kuan Yew, Nicolae Ceaușescu, Francisco Franco, Muammar Gaddafi, Suharto, Josip
Broz Tito, Mobutu Sese Seko, Chiang Kai-shek, Hosni Mubarak, Bashar al-Assad, Hafez
al-Assad. See infra Appendix A.
71 See Viswanatha & O’Keeffe, supra note 1.
72 See id.
70
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Philippines, Russia, Turkey, and China. Sometimes, however, the
dictator was named in his individual capacity, including cases
against Ferdinand Marcos, Jiang Zemin, and Radovan Karadžić.
Foreign dictators have litigated claims as both plaintiffs and
defendants in U.S. courts. In general, the types of cases in which
foreign dictators litigate can also be grouped into several substantive categories (although sometimes dictators are both plaintiffs
and defendants within these categories):
1. Dictators as plaintiffs.
a) Disputes over sovereign funds. Disputes over sovereign
funds deposited in U.S. banks abound.73 Typically, foreign countries deposit funds in U.S. financial institutions to conduct sovereign transactions. These funds become a source of litigation when
democratic opponents contest a dictatorial regime’s power, both
claiming to represent the country. These cases are, at bottom,
about executive recognition of foreign regimes. To name a few,
Venezuela, China, Iran, Chile, Nicaragua, and Panama have all
had dictators litigate against competing leaders over funds that
nominally belong to their respective countries. For example, in
1988, Panamanian President Eric Arturo Delvalle dismissed the
then-reigning dictator Manuel Noriega from his military post
in Panama.74 But Noriega refused to step down, setting up a
parallel administration to govern the country.75 This turmoil
pushed Delvalle to file a case in U.S. court, seeking to freeze all
Panamanian funds deposited in several bank accounts.76 This, in
turn, prompted Noriega’s regime to file motions to intervene in
the case.77 Ultimately, the court deferred to the U.S. president’s
recognition of Delvalle as the representative of “the only lawful
government of the Republic of Panama,” freezing the funds and

73 There is even treatment of this in the international law context. See, e.g., BRAD
ROTH, GOVERNMENTAL ILLEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 331 (1999); Victorino J.
Tejera, The U.S. Law Regime of Sovereign Immunity and the Sovereign Wealth Funds, 25
U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, 17–20 (2016).
74 See Elaine Sciolino, Panama President Dismisses Noriega; Situation Unclear, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 26, 1988), https://perma.cc/BL9L-FKVQ.
75 See Stephen Kinzer, Noriega Prevails as Assembly Picks a New President, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 27, 1988), https://perma.cc/Q7Q9-6PKN.
76 See Republic of Panama v. Republic Nat’l Bank of N.Y., 681 F. Supp. 1066, 1069
(S.D.N.Y. 1988).
77 Republic of Panama v. Citizens & S. Int’l Bank, 682 F. Supp. 1544, 1545
(S.D. Fla. 1988).
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putting them at the order of the Delvalle administration.78 The
Panama cases closely resemble cases involving the Shah of Iran,
Augusto Pinochet, and Tachito Somoza.79
b) Enforcing expropriation. Foreign dictators have filed
cases in the United States to enforce property expropriations.
Although expropriations typically take place in a foreign country,
they can often have ramifications for U.S. individuals, companies,
and funds. Notably, communist regimes—including those in
Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and the Soviet Union—initiated
prominent expropriation cases in U.S. courts.80 And, on closer inspection, many of these cases resulted from dictators’ attempts to
consolidate power. For instance, when Fidel Castro gained power
in 1959, he selectively expropriated strategic businesses to neutralize potential opposition. As I discuss below, this led to a legal
dispute between Cuba and a U.S. company that reached the U.S.
Supreme Court.81
c) Proxy claims against opponents, dissidents, and newspapers. A more recent crop of cases includes foreign dictatorships using proxies to pursue dissidents around the world.
As discussed above, this category includes cases linked to the
Chinese Communist Party, Russia’s Putin, Turkey’s Erdoğan,
and Venezuela’s Maduro.82 While many cases have been successful, some of these claims have been dismissed at early stages. For
instance, in 2020, a Chinese state-owned entity sued a Chinese
corruption suspect in California state court apparently with the
sole goal of forcing him to return to China.83 One month after the
suit was filed, the defendant returned to China and the plaintiff
78 Republic Nat’l Bank of N.Y., 681 F. Supp. at 1068–69; see also Citizens & S. Int’l
Bank, 682 F. Supp. at 1545.
79 See, e.g., Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 467 N.E.2d 245, 246–47 (N.Y. 1984);
Amended Complaint at 1–2, Consejo de Defensa del Estado de la Republica de Chile v. Banco
Santander Central Hispano, S.A., 2009 WL 2336429 (S.D. Fla. May 29, 2009) (No. 09-20621);
Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial at 1, Banco Santander Central Hispano, S.A., 2009 WL
1612257 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 11, 2009) (No. 109CV20621); Ope Shipping, Ltd. v. Allstate Ins., 521
F. Supp. 342, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
80 See, e.g., Bandes v. Harlow & Jones, Inc., 852 F.2d 661, 663 (2d Cir. 1988); Sabbatino,
376 U.S. at 401–08; Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp, 141 S. Ct. 703, 712–13, 715
(2021); Republic of Hungary v. Simon, 141 S. Ct. 691, 691 (2021) (per curiam).
81 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398.
82 See, e.g., Viswanatha & O’Keeffe, supra note 1; Avilon Auto. Grp. v. Leontiev, 168
A.D.3d 78, 84 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019); Smagin v. Yegiazaryan, 733 F. App’x 393, 394 (9th
Cir. 2018); Cabello-Rondón v. Dow Jones & Co., No. 16-CV-3346, 2017 WL 3531551, at *1–2
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2017), aff’d, 720 F. App’x 87 (2d Cir. 2018); Ateş v. Gülen, No. 15-CV-2354,
2016 WL 3568190, at *1 (M.D. Pa. June 29, 2016).
83 See Viswanatha & O’Keeffe, supra note 1.
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thereafter dismissed the complaint.84 The Chinese government
explicitly recognized that the lawsuit was a success precisely because it forced the defendant to return to China.85 Similarly, between 2015 and 2020, the Russian government and Putin proxies
filed a series of claims in U.S. district courts aimed at harassing
opponents or expanding the dictatorship’s reach.86 Some of the
most recent cases include defamation claims by three Russian oligarchs against BuzzFeed News and Fusion GPS over the Steele
dossier.87
2. Dictators as defendants.
a) Alien Tort Statute and Torture Victim Protection Act. In
the latter part of the twentieth century, victims of foreign dictatorships began to file dozens of cases in U.S. courts. These foreign tort
claims are rooted in a 1789 statute88 that gives plaintiffs a cause of
action for “torts committed anywhere in the world against aliens
in violation of the law of nations”89 and a 1991 statute90 that “authorizes a cause of action against ‘[a]n individual’ for acts of torture
and extrajudicial killing committed under authority or color of law
of any foreign nation.”91 Victim-plaintiffs in these cases alleged
torts including torture, rape, and murder. One notable case involved claims by victims of the Marcos dictatorship against Marcos
in his individual capacity, resulting in a $2 billion award.92 There
were similar claims by victims against Srpska’s Radovan
Karadžić,93 Iraq’s Saddam Hussein,94 and China’s Jiang Zemin.95

84

Id.
See id.
86 See ÅSLUND, supra note 3, at 23–27.
87 See Josh Gerstein, 3 Russians Named in Trump Dossier Sue Fusion GPS for Libel,
POLITICO (Oct. 4, 2017), https://perma.cc/RZ5J-YY7A; Josh Gerstein, Russian Bank Owners Sue BuzzFeed over Trump Dossier Publication, POLITICO (May 26, 2017),
https://perma.cc/7DRU-E4QH.
88 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77, amended by Alien Tort Statute,
ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869, 934 (1948) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350).
89 Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1995).
90 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73.
91 Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 566 U.S. 449, 451 (2012).
92 Hilao v. Est. of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 771, 781 (9th Cir. 1996).
93 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 236.
94 Kalasho v. Iraqi Gov’t, No. 1:00CV447, 2001 WL 34056852 (W.D. Mich. May 28, 2001).
95 Doe v. Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
85
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b) Torts, extradition, and criminal prosecutions. A few
dictators have had unusual interactions with U.S. courts.96 One
remarkable case stemmed from Augusto Pinochet’s order to
assassinate a Chilean critic in the United States by detonating
explosives in the middle of Washington, D.C.97 Surprisingly,
at least three dictators have been criminal defendants: Marcos
Pérez Jiménez, Saddam Hussein, and Manuel Noriega.98 All of
them, along with Ferdinand Marcos, ended up in the United
States or under U.S. military custody after their rule. After fleeing a democratic uprising in Venezuela, Pérez Jiménez relocated
to Florida in 1959. But after the Venezuelan government requested
extradition, U.S. authorities detained Pérez Jiménez, leading to a
series of cases where the former dictator filed habeas corpus proceedings and contested his extradition.99 Similarly, Manuel
Noriega became a criminal defendant after the U.S. military
seized him in Panama and the DOJ prosecuted him in U.S. court
for narcotrafficking.100 And Saddam Hussein requested a stay of
execution while in the custody of Iraqi and U.S. officials in 2006.101
c) Resisting expropriation. While foreign dictators have at
times enforced expropriation orders in U.S. courts, their victims
have filed cases against dictators to seek payment for expropriated property.102 These cases, again, involved mostly communist

96 Yet another category of claims covers corruption cases involving agents or instrumentalities of foreign dictatorships. See, e.g., Harvest Nat. Res., Inc. v. Ramirez Carreno,
No. CV H-18-483, 2020 WL 3063940, at *1–2 (S.D. Tex. June 9, 2020).
97 See De Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790, 791 (2d Cir. 1984).
98 See infra Appendix A.
99 See Judith Ewell, The Extradition of Marcos Pérez Jiménez, 1959-63: Practical Precedent for Enforcement of Administrative Honesty?, 9 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 291, 291–97 (1977).
100 See United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1997).
101 See In re Hussein, 468 F. Supp. 2d 126, 127 (D.D.C. 2006).
102 See, e.g., Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne Int’l Drilling Co.,
137 S. Ct. 1312, 1317 (2017); Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S.
682, 682 (1976); Comparelli v. Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela, 891 F.3d 1311, 1315
(11th Cir. 2018); Villoldo v. Castro-Ruz, 821 F.3d 196, 198–99 (1st Cir. 2016); Empresa
Cubana Exportadora de Azucar y Sus Derivados v. Lamborn & Co., 652 F.2d 231, 232–33
(2d Cir. 1981); Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355, 1360–61 (2d Cir. 1973), rev’d sub
nom. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc., 425 U.S. 682; Wahba v. Nat’l Bank of Egypt, 457 F.
Supp. 2d 721, 724–29 (E.D. Tex. 2006); Rusoro Mining Ltd. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 300 F. Supp. 3d 137, 141–45 (D.D.C. 2018); Davoyan v. Republic of Turkey, 116 F.
Supp. 3d 1084, 1090 (C.D. Cal. 2013), aff’d on other grounds sub nom. Bakalian v. Cent.
Bank of Republic of Turk., 932 F.3d 1229 (9th Cir. 2019); McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 116 F. Supp. 2d 13, 18–21 (D.D.C. 2000), aff’d in part sub nom. McKesson
HBOC, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 271 F.3d 1101 (D.C. Cir. 2001), vacated in part,
320 F.3d 280 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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regimes, including those in Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and the
Soviet Union.
Setting the type of claim aside, it is difficult to gauge whether
foreign dictators have succeeded in U.S. courts. Measuring
whether foreign dictators won on the merits provides no real answer for a few reasons. First, when foreign dictators are plaintiffs
in U.S. courts, they may be interested in harassing, intimidating,
or imposing costs on opponents. So losing on the merits may still
be a “win” as part of a broader political harassment campaign.
Second, when dictators are defendants, success may not be on the
merits either because claims can be dismissed due to sovereign or
official immunity. But even when foreign dictators lose on the
merits, plaintiffs may have an extremely difficult time collecting
on their awards.103 Finally, it is not easy to isolate litigation results from parallel diplomatic efforts. What looks like a win or
loss on the merits may look very different once we account for
diplomatic channels. Still, taking all of this into account, dictators’ success on the merits is rare when they are plaintiffs but
common when they are defendants.104 That is because courts usually find dictatorships immune. Below, in Part I.C–D, I discuss
dictators’ legal defenses and related doctrines in more detail.
B. Relevant Historical Cases
In this Section, I explore the development of dictator-related
cases and related comity doctrines over time. The point of this
Section is to understand the principles that govern these cases
and how U.S. courts have evolved to treat dictators over the past
few decades.
There are three common and relevant themes. First, courts
have used the extraordinary nature of these cases to bolster a series of foreign relations doctrines and statutes, including the privilege of bringing suit, act of state, and sovereign and official immunities. To be sure, these doctrines have their own complex
histories involving democratic governments too. I do not cover
that broader history—only the cases where these doctrines and
dictatorships overlap. Second, in this context, the separation of
powers between the judiciary and the executive waxes and
wanes—sometimes courts completely defer to the executive, and

103
104

Cf. Republic of Argentina v. NML Cap., Ltd., 573 U.S. 134, 136–37 (2014).
See infra Appendix A.
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at other times they insist on judicial prerogatives.105 Third, while
courts have struggled with whether to treat dictatorships differently than democratic governments, most courts have embraced
an equal-treatment principle that does not draw a distinction between regime types. Importantly, there is a sprinkle of cases that
suggest that courts are capable of drawing distinctions between
foreign governments but are also wary of disrupting foreign affairs.
On the whole, these decisions are dominated by functionalist concerns. Again, the cases below are not comprehensive. I cover only
the most relevant dictator cases for purposes of this study.
1. The first cases in the nineteenth century: sovereign
immunity and the privilege of bringing suit.
Foreign authoritarian leaders have been in our courts from
the beginning of the republic.106 The landmark case The Schooner
Exchange v. McFaddon107 began in 1811 when two U.S. plaintiffs
claimed ownership of a French ship in the port of Philadelphia.108
The case was unusual, however, because it directly implicated
property of a foreign emperor, Napoleon Bonaparte.109 Facing this
delicate fact pattern, Chief Justice John Marshall held for a unanimous Supreme Court that foreign government vessels entering
the United States “are to be considered as exempted by the consent of that power from its jurisdiction.”110 Chief Justice Marshall
rooted what is now called “absolute sovereign immunity”111 in the
need for courts to avoid “breach[es] of faith” that might impact
the nations’ foreign affairs.112 Setting aside the details, Schooner
Exchange stands for two lasting principles: (1) that, while a
105 As Professors Ganesh Sitaraman and Ingrid Wuerth note, in the early nineteenth
century, courts mostly resolved foreign affairs cases without fully deferring to the executive. Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 56, at 1911–12; see also White, supra note 26, at
27–28, 44, 81, 95, 141, 144–45.
106 I’m not suggesting here that all foreign emperors or monarchs were dictators. But
they do fall under the umbrella of authoritarian leaders that have shaped the history of
dictator-related doctrines and cases.
107 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
108 Id. at 117.
109 Although the case was in rem and the defendant was officially a boat. See id. at
118. At that time, as King Louis XIV had previously recognized with the apocryphal
phrase “L’État, c’est à moi,” the King was the state. See Wuerth, supra note 54, at 677–78
(collecting cases); Herbert H. Rowen, “L’État c’est à moi”: Louis XIV and the State, 2
FRENCH HIST. STUD. 83, 83 (1961).
110 Schooner Exch., 11 U.S. at 145–46.
111 See Garb v. Republic of Poland, 440 F.3d 579, 585 (2d Cir. 2006).
112 Schooner Exch., 11 U.S. at 146. Courts have called this “international comity.” See,
e.g., Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 417.
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nation has jurisdiction over disputes in its territory, there is also
absolute immunity for foreign government property and (2) that
U.S. courts can consider the executive’s input on questions of sovereign immunity.113
Although U.S. courts repeatedly hosted cases against foreign
monarchs in the early nineteenth century,114 the next relevant
case for our purposes also involved a Napoleon. But this time, it
was Bonaparte’s nephew, Emperor Napoleon III. In 1867, an
American ship collided with a French transport ship named The
Sapphire near San Francisco. Unlike in Schooner Exchange, it
was the French government—in the name of the emperor—that
filed suit in a U.S. district court to recover damages for the
crash.115 With an emperor as plaintiff, the question was now
whether “the French Emperor [could] sue in our courts.”116 The
Supreme Court held that foreign sovereigns were allowed to
“prosecute [cases] in our courts,” because to deny them that privilege “would manifest a want of comity and friendly feeling.”117
The Court rooted this privilege, among other areas, in the diversity jurisdiction clause of Article III, noting that “[t]he Constitution expressly extends the judicial power to controversies between
a State, or citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens, or subjects.”118 Importantly, the Court explicitly refused to draw a distinction between Napoleon as emperor and his potential successors in France, noting that “[t]he reigning Emperor, or National
Assembly, or other actual person or party in power, is but the
agent and representative of the national sovereignty.”119 The privilege of suing in our courts, the Court affirmed, was given to the
foreign sovereign, regardless of who was officially in power in that

113 This immunity is comity based. And there is also a distinction between immunity
from suit and immunity of property from execution. For a broader discussion of absolute
sovereign immunity, see generally Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Dep’t
of State, to Philip B. Perlman, Acting Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Just. (May 19, 1952), in 26 DEP’T
STATE OF BULL. 984–85 (1952). The role of executive suggestions has its own complicated
history and continues to be contested. See, e.g., Keitner, supra note 22 at 51–52; Ingrid
Wuerth, Foreign Official Immunity Determinations in U.S. Courts: The Case Against the
State Department, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 915, 943–45 (2011).
114 See Wuerth, supra note 54, at 671–73, 676–77 (collecting cases).
115 See The Sapphire, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 164, 164 (1870).
116 Id. at 167.
117 Id.
118 Id. (emphasis in original).
119 Id. at 168.
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country.120 This was an embrace of an equal-treatment principle
for all regime types.
The end of the nineteenth century brought two blockbuster
cases, one with lasting effects and the other largely forgotten. In
1897, the Supreme Court first recognized the act of state doctrine,
holding in Underhill v. Hernandez121 that U.S. courts could not
sit in judgment of actions by a Venezuelan military leader on
Venezuelan land.122 The act of state holding set the foundation for
a long line of cases that have refused to judge foreign authoritarian
actions, even if such actions would otherwise be cognizable under
U.S. law.
Despite the apparent trend of refusing to treat dictators
any differently than democratic governments, only a year after
Underhill, the Court seemed to take a different tack in Camou v.
United States123 (albeit in a case where the dictator was a nonparty). In 1891, a landowner filed a claim for a tract of land in the
Court of Private Lands Claims for the territory of Arizona.124 The
land claim hinged on an unusual source—an 1828 auction conducted by local authorities in what was then Sonora, Mexico. To
decide the petitioner’s claim, however, U.S. courts first had to determine whether the Sonoran local officials or the Mexican central government possessed authority over the land in 1828. That
question, in turn, depended on the effect of an 1853 proclamation
by Mexican dictator Antonio López de Santa Anna, which stated—
with retroactive applicability—that the Mexican central government had ultimate authority over land grants. In the face of this
proclamation, which seemingly should have decided the question,
the U.S. Supreme Court refused to abide by Santa Anna’s decree.
In an unusual passage, the Court noted the following:
While it is true that practically Santa Anna occupied for the
time being the position of dictator, it must not be forgotten
that Mexico, after its separation from Spain in 1821, was assuming to act as a republic subject to express constitutional
limitations. While temporary departures are disclosed in her
history, the dominant and continuous thought was of a popular government under a constitution which defined rights,
duties and powers. In that aspect the spasmodic decrees
120
121
122
123
124

See The Sapphire, 78 U.S. at 167–68.
168 U.S. 250 (1897).
Id. at 252–53.
171 U.S. 277 (1898).
See id. at 277.
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made by dictators in the occasional interruptions of constitutional government should not be given conclusive weight
in the determination of rights created during peaceful and
regular eras.125
Surprisingly, the Court seemed to draw a distinction between
democratic actions and dictatorial decrees. “The divestiture of titles once legally vested is a judicial act. In governments subject to
ordinary constitutional limitations a mere executive declaration
disturbs no rights that have been vested.”126 Taking specific note
of Santa Anna’s position as “dictator,” the Court noted that it
would go “too far to hold that the mere declaration of a rule of law
made by a temporary dictator . . . is to be regarded as operative
and determinative.”127 The Court also explicitly set aside the fact
that the executive had recognized and negotiated with Santa
Anna.128 This potential separation-of-powers conflict did not give
the Court, or the executive, pause. Ultimately, the Court held that
“for the reasons heretofore mentioned . . . we think this arbitrary
declaration by a temporary dictator was not potent to destroy the
title.”129
In conclusion, nineteenth-century cases prompted U.S. courts
to recognize the doctrines of absolute sovereign immunity, act of
state, and the privilege of foreign sovereigns to sue in U.S. court.
On the whole, the emerging trend was that courts were unwilling
to discern different types of government, concentrating only on
the rights of foreign sovereigns qua sovereigns. To be sure, most
nineteenth-century governments were not fully democratic. So even
the possibility of distinguishing democracies and dictatorships
would have been unintuitive. However, Camou represents a powerful articulation of an alternative model because the Supreme
Court explicitly recognized a difference between authoritarian and
democratic forms of government. Perhaps all of this highlights
an underlying principle in these cases: courts may want to draw
distinctions between types of governments, but they are wary of
impacting U.S. foreign affairs.

125
126
127
128
129

Id. at 290.
Id.
Id. at 291.
Camou, 171 U.S. at 290–91.
Id. at 291.
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2. Communist dictatorships and the separation of powers.
The emergence of communist dictatorships after World War I
and World War II raised a host of questions for U.S. courts concerning property expropriations and the separation of powers.
The October Revolution of 1917 and the Soviet government’s subsequent nationalization of Russian companies—and their worldwide assets—provoked a series of contentious property disputes
in the United States. In 1933, President Roosevelt recognized the
Soviet Union’s government and “accepted an assignment . . . of
certain claims” to Russian property in the United States.130 These
developments led to a string of cases involving property claims,
foreign nationalizations, and the executive’s power to unilaterally
recognize foreign governments. The Supreme Court generally recognized the president’s power not only to negotiate executive
agreements but also to determine the country’s foreign affairs policies more generally.131 These decisions, of course, increased the
executive’s power to deal with foreign dictatorships.132
While dictator cases made an imprint on foreign relations
law, they were only a small part of the broader trend towards
deference to the executive. As Professors Ganesh Sitaraman and
Ingrid Wuerth have argued, the Supreme Court revolutionized
foreign relations law in the early twentieth century, “adopt[ing]
the idea that foreign affairs are an exceptional sphere of policymaking, distinct from domestic law and best suited to exclusively
federal, and primarily executive, control.”133 This birth of “foreign
relations exceptionalism” came out of a mix of cases involving
both foreign democracies and dictatorships. The Court generally
did not treat dictatorship cases differently.134
Despite the growing pile of pro-executive cases in the foreign
affairs context, the end of World War II brought a renewed focus
on dictator cases, which continued to challenge the judiciary. In a
series of cases over Nazi expropriations, lower courts held that
even in such odious circumstances, U.S. courts had to recognize

130 United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 211 (1942); see also United States v. Belmont,
301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937).
131 Pink, 315 U.S. at 211, 230.
132 However, courts were not obligated to recognize Russian expropriations in the
United States. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 448 (White, J., dissenting) (collecting cases).
133 Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 56, at 1900.
134 See generally United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). See
Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 56, at 1911–19; see also White, supra note 26, at 99.
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actions of the Nazi regime as foreign acts of state.135 Importantly,
Judge Learned Hand qualified his decision in one such case by
noting that courts should look to the executive for guidance.136
This call for executive guidance coincided with two related developments. In Bernstein v. N. V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche
Stoomvaart-Maatschappij,137 the State Department asked courts
to allow plaintiffs to pursue claims related to Nazi expropriations.138 Only a few years later, the 1952 Tate Letter announced a
State Department policy of restrictive—not absolute—sovereign
immunity.139 Both of these executive moves explicitly pushed the
judiciary to hear sovereign cases.
Then, in the early 1950s, courts faced disputes between the
Mao regime and its rival, the Kuomintang. As both authoritarian
regimes claimed to be the true representatives of the Chinese government, their dispute spilled into U.S. cases over property belonging to Chinese instrumentalities. In Bank of China v. Wells
Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co.,140 a district court was asked
whether funds belonging to the state-owned Bank of China and
deposited in Wells Fargo could be repossessed by the Mao or the
Kuomintang regime.141 The plaintiffs initially filed the case on
November 9, 1949, one month after Mao’s proclamation of the
People’s Republic of China but still weeks before Chiang Kai-shek’s
exodus to Taiwan.142 The U.S. government, however, recognized
only the Kuomintang.143
With this set of facts, the court ultimately deferred to the executive’s position that the Kuomintang was the true representative of China.144 However, the court noted that it need not completely defer to the executive because executive recognition of a
foreign government was but one “fact which properly should be
considered and weighed along with the other facts before the
court.”145 Like previous cases, the court did not take into account
135 See, e.g., Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246, 248–
49 (2d Cir. 1947).
136 See id. at 251.
137 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954).
138 See id. at 375–76.
139 Letter from Jack Tate to Philip Perlman, supra note 113, at 984.
140 104 F. Supp. 59 (N.D. Cal. 1952), aff’d, 209 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1953).
141 Id. at 63.
142 See Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Tr. Co., 92 F. Supp. 920, 921–22
(N.D. Cal. 1950).
143 Wells Fargo, 104 F. Supp. at 63–65.
144 Id. at 63.
145 Id. at 64.
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that Mao’s regime was dictatorial or repressive as compared to
the Kuomintang, which was itself also authoritarian in Taiwan.
The Cuban Revolution and its consequences picked up the
thread laid by the Soviet and Chinese precedents. In 1960, the
Castro regime nationalized and expropriated any property in
Cuba “in which American nationals had an interest.”146 This unleashed a series of disputes between U.S. Cuban-property owners
and the government of Cuba, including a prominent case in the
Southern District of New York.147 The first Cuban case to arrive
at the Supreme Court, however, was a claim by the Cuban government—through the Cuban National Bank—as plaintiff
against a U.S. commodity broker alleging that the defendant
misappropriated proceeds from the sale of a shipment of Cuban
sugar.148 Cuba’s case hinged on the court’s acceptance of its nationalization of the sugar companies and resulting proceeds.
The defendant responded to Cuba’s claim with two relevant
arguments: (1) that the privilege of suing in U.S. courts—based
on international comity—should not be extended to Cuba because
it was “an unfriendly foreign power in whose courts neither the
United States nor its nationals can obtain relief” and (2) that the
plaintiff’s claim involved enforcing a property expropriation that
violated international law.149 Although the executive branch did
not take an official position in the case, the defendant cited a series
of unrelated statements by the State Department and the U.S.
government that criticized Castro’s dictatorship and communist
regime. For instance, the defendant’s brief cited a State Department
bulletin criticizing Cuba for adopting “totalitarian policies and
techniques to cement dictatorial control over the Cuban people.”150
An amicus brief similarly quoted a German court decision, noting
that “expropriation cannot possibly be reconciled with the principles underlying a democratic state.”151
With the question of foreign dictatorships teed up in the most
straightforward way, the Supreme Court rejected defendants’
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Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 401.
Cf. Berlanti Constr. Co. v. Republic of Cuba, 190 F. Supp. 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1960)
(discussing whether proper service was made on the Republic of Cuba).
148 See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 406–07.
149 Brief for Respondent Farr, Whitlock & Co. at 13, Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (No. 16).
150 Id. at 38 (quoting 46 DEP’T OF STATE BULL. 129 (1962)).
151 Brief for the Committee on International Law of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York as Amicus Curiae at 46, Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (No. 16) (quotation
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arguments and refused to treat the Cuban dictatorship any differently than other sovereigns.152 First, the Court held that “principles of comity” that allow “sovereign states . . . to sue in the
courts of the United States” were fully applicable in this case.153
Never mind that the United States had severed diplomatic relations with Cuba or that Cuban courts did not extend reciprocal
treatment to U.S. citizens. The majority concluded that “[t]his
Court would hardly be competent to undertake assessments of
varying degrees of friendliness . . . we are constrained to consider
any relationship, short of war, with a recognized sovereign power
as embracing the privilege of resorting to United States courts.”154
As long as the United States recognized a foreign sovereign—a
prerogative that was “exclusively a function of the Executive”—
that sovereign would be allowed to sue in our courts.155
Second, the Court held that it could not pass judgment on
Cuba’s expropriation order because of the act of state doctrine.
Although the Court recognized that the doctrine was mandated
neither by the Constitution nor any statute or international law,
it defended the principle that “conduct of one independent government cannot be successfully questioned in the courts of another.”156 To do so would “imperil the amicable relations between
governments and vex the peace of nations.”157 Instead, foreigngovernment acts within their territory must be accepted by U.S.
courts as a rule of decision.158 For that reason, the Court held that
it had to respect Cuba’s expropriation and enforce that country’s
rights over the sugar proceeds.159
Although Congress technically overruled Sabbatino through
the so-called Hickenlooper Amendment in 1982,160 the twentieth
century solidified the case law on dictatorships: these regimes are
generally no different than any other type of government for purposes of U.S. litigation, so long as the executive recognizes that
government. Still, after Sabbatino, act of state flourished in lower
courts and continued to shield foreign dictatorships—despite
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See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 410.
Id. at 408–09.
154 Id. at 410.
155 Id. The court explicitly contrasted this to the judgment enforcement context. Id.
at 411–12.
156 Id. at 417 (quoting Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303–04 (1918)).
157 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 418 (quoting Oetjen, 246 U.S. at 303–04).
158 See id. at 417–18.
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explicit opposition from the executive. In First National City
Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba,161 the State Department explicitly asked the Court to waive the act of state doctrine in that
case.162 But courts nonetheless applied the doctrine in the 1970s,
including in a case where Libya’s Colonel Gaddafi avoided antitrust scrutiny.163 A 1968 Supreme Court case captured the spirit
of the era, invalidating an Oregon statute on estates—requiring
reciprocal treatment of U.S. citizens in foreign countries—because it “seems to make unavoidable judicial criticism of nations
established on a more authoritarian basis than our own.”164
The Supreme Court held that this interfered with the federal government’s foreign affairs powers and was therefore null and
void.165 Still, as I discuss in Part II, courts have applied the equaltreatment principle unevenly, often judging foreign autocrats.
3. The FSIA, Alien Tort Statute, and globalized
dictatorships after 1976.
Congress adopted the FSIA in 1976, finally codifying the doctrine that foreign sovereigns are immune from suit in U.S.
court.166 Although the FSIA grants a baseline blanket immunity
from suit, it also contains a series of important exceptions. These
include cases where the foreign sovereign contractually waives
immunity, participates in commercial activity in the United
States, takes property in violation of international law, or causes
tortious acts in the United States.167
With increased globalization in the 1970s and 1980s, enactment of the FSIA coincided with a flurry of new cases involving
foreign dictatorships in U.S. court.168 For instance, the new Islamic
dictatorship of Iran filed several cases in U.S. courts against the
departed shah and his family over oil contracts and the enforcement of foreign awards.169 In one of the most extraordinary
161

406 U.S. 759 (1972).
See id. at 781–82.
163 See Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 69–70, 73 (2d Cir. 1977).
164 Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440 (1968).
165 Id. at 436.
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White, supra note 26.
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168 See infra Appendix A.
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dictator-related events, Chile’s Pinochet ordered the assassination of a former Chilean ambassador (and prominent critic) living
in the United States. The ensuing explosion of Orlando Letelier’s
car in the middle of Washington, D.C., led to a 1978 case against
Chile.170 A district court ultimately granted a default award
against the country.171 As discussed above, Manuel Noriega and
his democratic challengers also litigated over Panamanian funds
located in the United States.172 And even Libya’s military dictator,
Gaddafi, faced claims for colluding with oil companies to exclude
smaller oil producers from Libyan oil fields.173
A revitalized Alien Tort Statute174 became a new source of cases
over foreign human rights violations.175 In 1980, the Second Circuit
held that “Paraguayan citizens could sue a former Paraguayan
police inspector for allegedly torturing and killing a member of
their family in Paraguay, in violation of international law.”176
That case single-handedly triggered a wave of litigation against
foreign dictators, making the United States “unique in opening its
courts to civil suits by foreign plaintiffs against foreign governmental officials for human rights violations that occurred on foreign soil.”177 The best example of these claims involves Philippine
dictator Ferdinand Marcos. In 1986, a class action of human
rights victims served Marcos in Hawaii—where he had fled
after the 1986 presidential election—with a complaint alleging
“torture, summary execution and disappearance of thousands of
Filipinos.”178 Despite the fact that the complaint alleged only
actions that took place abroad, the claims were cognizable in U.S.
court under the Alien Tort Statute. The Ninth Circuit initially
granted immunity to Marcos from similar claims179 but later
allowed these claims to proceed as a class action.180 Notably, the
executive branch submitted an amicus brief supporting plaintiffs’
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actions only to the extent that Marcos’s violations of international
law formed part of U.S. law.181 In 1992, the Ninth Circuit held
that the FSIA did not provide immunity to Marcos because his
crimes were not “committed in an official capacity.”182 After years
of litigation, one of the cases reached a jury trial and resulted in an
award of nearly $2 billion against Marcos and other defendants.183
Even when plaintiffs were able to avoid sovereign immunity
and obtain awards—as in the Marcos cases—they found it extremely difficult to actually obtain payment or attach foreign assets. In light of this problem, especially in suits related to terrorism, Congress amended the FSIA in 1998 to “provide for
attachment and execution of otherwise-blocked assets and government assistance in locating the assets in suits against state
sponsors of terrorism.”184
Finally, in the 2000s, courts conclusively addressed the status of head-of-state immunity. In 2004, a group of unidentified
plaintiffs belonging to the Chinese group Falun Gong filed a claim
against China’s former premier, Jiang Zemin, while he traveled
through the United States.185 The plaintiffs alleged that Jiang
“organize[d] and direct[ed] the suppression of Falun Gong
throughout China,” leading to a series of human rights violations—including rape, execution, disappearances, and torture.186
The U.S. government, however, filed an amicus brief suggesting
that Jiang was “immune from the jurisdiction of the Court because he is China’s former head of state.”187 The court accepted
the executive’s suggestion, holding that although the FSIA judicialized immunity determinations, it was never intended to cover
head-of-state claims.188 Six years later, in Samantar v. Yousuf,189
the Supreme Court agreed, holding that the FSIA did not apply
to foreign officials sued in their official capacity.190 Instead, the

181 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 20–24, Trajano, No. 86-2448 (9th
Cir. Oct. 29, 1987).
182 In re Est. of Ferdinand E. Marcos Hum. Rts. Litig., 978 F.2d 493, 497–98
(9th Cir. 1992).
183 See Hilao, 103 F.3d at 771, 781.
184 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 7, at 2182 n.261.
185 See Plaintiffs A, B, C, D, E, F v. Jiang Zemin, 282 F. Supp. 2d 875, 879 (N.D. Ill.
2003), aff’d sub nom. Wei Ye v. Jiang Zemin, 383 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 2004).
186 Jiang Zemin, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 878.
187 Id. at 879.
188 See id. at 879, 881.
189 560 U.S. 305 (2010).
190 See id. at 325.
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common law governs foreign official immunity, with potential input by the State Department.191
4. Twenty-first century democratic recession: how new
dictators and their proxies take advantage of U.S. courts.
The last fifteen years have brought new kinds of cases, which
stem from a rise in global terrorism and a worldwide democratic
recession. To be sure, the Supreme Court and “the federal political branches have, with limited exceptions, taken steps to limit
international human rights litigation in U.S. courts.”192 But in
dozens of other cases, plaintiffs have been able to sue foreign regimes over alleged sponsorship of terrorism.193 While courts have
constrained the reach of the Alien Tort Statute, Congress has expanded exceptions to the FSIA. One major growth area comes
from new dictatorships in countries that have long been considered U.S. allies—like Venezuela and Turkey—and in states with
commercial and historical links to the United States. Because of
these previous relationships, recent claims have often involved
sovereign property in the United States or political emigres who
have fled here. Moreover, these dictatorships have used proxies
or cronies to file their cases in U.S. court, hiding any official
involvement.194
The most worrisome cases involve efforts by foreign dictators
to exploit the U.S. judiciary to their advantage. Regimes dress up
these cases as run-of-the-mill claims (e.g., defamation, contract
claims, enforcement of foreign awards, discovery requests pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782, and bankruptcy disputes). Sometimes,
state-affiliated companies—like China’s Huawei or Russia’s
Kaspersky Lab—sue in U.S. courts to pursue seemingly commercial interests that are, on closer look, aligned with an authoritarian
regime’s goals.195 Notable cases involve dictatorships in China,
Venezuela, Russia, and Turkey.
For instance, in 2014, a Chinese anticorruption program
announced a “multidimensional ‘legal war’” against corruption
191
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suspects around the world.196 As part of this plan, the Chinese
government decided to “sue fugitives in American courts” with the
apparent goal of harassing defendants, draining their financial
resources, and forcing them to return to China.197 But, instead of
filing those cases in China’s sovereign capacity, the program recruited state-owned businesses to do its bidding. This has resulted in at least six civil cases in state and federal courts on
claims ranging from breach of fiduciary duty to fraud.198 Surprisingly, Chinese officials have called “the lawsuit strategy a success, publicly citing one of the suits as helping to force one of their
most-wanted home.”199 U.S. officials, however, have called the
lawsuits an “effort to pursue political targets rather than just
criminal ones.”200 Allegedly, the Chinese suits have been paired
with physical harassment, stalking—including by Chinese agents
dressed as fake FBI officials—and outright threats.201 All of this
appears to be an organized attempt by a foreign dictatorship to
use U.S. civil lawsuits for political ends.
Similarly, Turkey’s dictator, Erdoğan, used government lawyers to go after his main opponent—Muhammed Fethullah Gülen,
a cleric who lives in Pennsylvania.202 But instead of filing the case
in the name of Turkey, it appears that Erdoğan’s regime recruited
regular citizens as proxies to file a seemingly private case. The
complaint alleged that Gülen engaged in religious persecution
against plaintiffs within Turkey.203 But the litigation coincided
with a broader effort by Erdoğan to purge the Turkish opposition
and weaken Gülen’s status as his most important political opponent.204 Moreover, the fact that Turkish government lawyers represented these supposed individual plaintiffs suggests a broader
government plan. Not only did the Turkish government hire the
law firm, but the main plaintiffs’ lawyer also admitted that the
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lawsuit “represents a legal battle as well as a political battle and
an investigation targeting the Gülen Movement” and would show
that Gülen is “not untouchable in the United States.”205 Never
mind that the district court dismissed the case early on; it appears
that Erdoğan decided to use the U.S. legal system to harass Gülen
in his home state of Pennsylvania. Turkey seems to be using other
types of claims to pursue its interests as well.206
Or take, for example, claims by Venezuela in U.S. court. In
2016, the second-most powerful official in Venezuela’s dictatorship, Diosdado Cabello, sued the Wall Street Journal over an article that suggested he was a narcotrafficker. Although the district court dismissed the claim, Cabello appealed to the Second
Circuit and pursued his claim for nearly two years.207 This case
involved Cabello’s individual interests in his reputation but, importantly, also implicated the dictatorship’s political goals to push
back against U.S. pressure. Another notorious regime crony also
sued the U.S. network Univision for defamation on similar
grounds.208 In 2019, disputes between dictator Nicolás Maduro
and his opponent, Juan Guaidó, triggered another series of cases.
Guaidó, as opposition leader and president of the Venezuelan
legislature, assumed the Venezuelan presidency in 2019 after
Maduro refused to hold free and fair elections.209 The United
States recognized Guaidó, leading to two separate regimes both
claiming to represent Venezuela in many contexts. This situation
resulted in legal disputes over Venezuelan property in the United
States, including ownership over oil distributor CITGO, which is
based in the United States. Cases have proliferated, with nearly
half a dozen claims filed in Massachusetts, Florida, Illinois, D.C.,
and Delaware.210 These cases have put U.S. courts in the difficult
position of deciding whether Guaidó or Maduro has standing to
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206 See generally, e.g., In re Petition of the Republic of Turkey for an Order Directing
Discovery from Hamit Ciçek Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782, No. 19-CV-20107, 2020 WL
2539232 (D.N.J. May 18, 2020) (order granting the Republic of Turkey’s motion to compel
discovery), vacated sub nom. Republic of Turkey v. Cicek, No. 19-20107, 2020 WL 8073613
(D.N.J. June 4, 2020).
207 See Cabello-Rondón, 720 F. App’x at 88.
208 See generally Alex Saab v. Univision Comm’ns Inc., No. 2018-031253-CA-01 (Fla.
Cir. Ct. Sept. 14, 2018).
209 See Diego Zambrano, Guaidó, Not Maduro, Is the De Jure President of Venezuela,
LAWFARE (Feb. 1, 2019), https://perma.cc/FP52-PJZ8.
210 See infra Appendix A.
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sue. Despite U.S. actions to recognize Guaidó and even to issue
indictments against Maduro, Venezuela’s dictatorial regime continues to litigate across the country and in other foreign courts.211
Russia has been one of the most prolific foreign authoritarian
governments to take advantage of U.S. courts.212 Since roughly
2004, Russian proxies have filed several cases against dissidents
and Putin critics.213 Some of these cases involve enforcement of
foreign awards against dissident politicians, bankruptcy disputes, and discovery requests for foreign proceedings that “were
part of a coordinated effort to use the US courts to harass and
further extort assets” from opponents.214 In one example, Putin’s
attempt to expropriate a Russian alcohol manufacturer included
“fabricated criminal charges” against the owner, extradition requests, and trademark infringement cases.215 The Atlantic Council
called some of these cases an orchestrated Russian effort to “exploit[ ] US courts by pursuing superficially legitimate lawsuits
with a two-part purpose: perpetrating global harassment campaigns against the Kremlin’s enemies, while seeking to enrich
themselves through bad faith claims made possible by the Russian
state’s abuse.”216 Some of these cases have led to protracted struggles in both federal and state courts, including extensive discovery requests and claims by a state judge that there was a “blatant
misuse of the federal forum.”217 Two cases involved defamation
claims by three Russian oligarchs against BuzzFeed News and
Christopher Steele over the Steele dossier.218
In addition to these dictatorships-as-plaintiffs claims, there
are also cases where these dictatorships are defendants. In the
past decade, Venezuela has faced at least ten claims related to
expropriations or arbitral awards.219 The DNC sued Russia and

211 See Venezuela Gold: Maduro Government Wins in UK Appeals Court, BBC (Oct. 5
2020), https://perma.cc/XH63-LLSU.
212 See ÅSLUND, supra note 3 at 23–27.
213 See infra Appendix A.
214 ÅSLUND, supra note 3, at 18.
215 Id. at 17; see also Fed. Treasury Enter. Sojuzplodoimport v. Spirits Int’l N.V., 425
F. Supp. 2d 458, 460–61 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 623 F.3d 61, 71
(2d Cir. 2010).
216 ÅSLUND, supra note 3, at 23–24.
217 Leontiev, 168 A.D.3d at 84 (noting that plaintiffs refiled their case in state court
just prior to their federal action being dismissed).
218 See, e.g., Fridman v. Bean LLC, No. 17-2041, 2019 WL 231751, at *1–2 (D.D.C.
Jan. 14, 2019); Tatintsyan v. Barr, 799 F. App’x 965, 966 (9th Cir. 2020).
219 See infra Appendix A.
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several officials over cyberattacks during the 2016 election.220 And
Cuba, Iran, Turkey, and Syria continue to face claims for torts,
forfeitures, or takings.221 Continuing democratic recession will almost surely expand these kinds of claims.
It’s difficult to measure the importance of these cases. The
fact that there are dozens of such claims likely hides their impact
on defendants and other related parties. These claims may be
most significant not because of each case’s outcome on the merits
but because of litigation’s chilling effect on dissidents and journalists. Easy access to U.S. courts is itself a victory for autocratic
regimes.
C. Current Doctrines and the Executive’s Role
As the history indicates, dictator cases have been part and
parcel of the development of domestic law on foreign relations.
Courts have used dictator cases to bolster doctrines that emerge
out of international comity. As Professor William Dodge has recognized, “no rule of customary international law requires the
United States to recognize the judgment of a foreign court, to
treat a foreign act of state as valid, or to allow foreign governments to bring suit as plaintiffs in U.S. courts.”222 And yet courts
recognize these rules on a regular basis.
One underlying principle to all these doctrines is the courtcreated equal-treatment principle. Courts have repeatedly expressed unwillingness to draw distinctions between foreign government types, embracing instead regime-neutral doctrines. This
principle traces back to The Sapphire,223 where the Court noted
that “[t]he reigning Emperor, or National Assembly, or other actual person or party in power, is but the agent and representative
of the national sovereignty.”224 This approach resembles the domestic equal sovereignty principle.225 But it differs from the concept of sovereign equality because even if “states are equal as legal
persons in international law, this equality does not require that in
all matters a state must treat all other states in the same way.”226
220 See Wuerth, supra note 67; Kristen E. Eichensehr, Public-Private Cybersecurity,
95 TEX. L. REV. 467, 489, 529–30 (2017).
221 See infra Appendix A.
222 Dodge, supra note 56, at 2074 (citations omitted).
223 78 U.S. (11 Wall) 164 (1870).
224 Id. at 168.
225 See Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2623–24 (2013).
226 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW: PEACE 376, 376–77 (Robert Jennings & Arthur
Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992) (“There is in customary international law no clearly established
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1. Dictators and foreign relations doctrines.
We can summarize the relevant doctrines as follows:227
a) Privilege of suing in U.S. courts. As The Sapphire established and Sabbatino reaffirmed, “sovereign states are allowed
to sue in the courts of the United States.”228 This privilege depends
neither on friendly relations with the U.S. government nor on the
specific type of government in power. The only exception to this
privilege is for “governments at war with the United States . . . .”229
Dictatorships at odds with U.S. foreign policy—or even direct
rivals like Cuba, Venezuela, Russia, or China—still enjoy the
privilege of suing in U.S. court.
b) Sovereign immunity. Schooner Exchange first established the basic rule that foreign sovereigns enjoy blanket immunity from process in U.S. courts. The FSIA codified a more restrictive version of this immunity, providing that all foreign
sovereigns enjoy a baseline of immunity subject to a growing
number of exceptions.230 These exceptions include expropriations
in violation of international law, commercial activities, domestic
torts, and claims against state sponsors of terrorism.231
c) Head-of-state or foreign-official immunity. Heads of
state and other foreign officials sometimes enjoy immunity from
U.S. proceedings. Customary international law divides this kind
of immunity into status-based and conduct-based immunity.232
Within status-based immunity, heads of state, heads of government, and foreign ministers are absolutely immune for their official acts while in office.233 Conduct-based immunity shields former

general obligation on a state not to differentiate between other states in the treatment it
accords to them.”).
227 There are other rules, principles, and doctrines that have made some appearance
in—but don’t seem to be at the center of—these cases. See, e.g., Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 448
F.3d 176, 178 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussing international comity abstention in a case involving
Egypt’s dictatorship).
228 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 408–09 (citing The Sapphire, 78 U.S. at 167).
229 Id. at 409.
230 See Stewart, supra note 167 at 41–66.
231 See id.
232 See Chimène I. Keitner, Transnational Litigation: Jurisdiction and Immunities,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 796, 801 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2013); see
also Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 769–72 (4th Cir. 2012).
233 See Dodge & Keitner, supra note 53, at 20; William S. Dodge, Foreign Official Immunity in the International Law Commission: The Meanings of “Official Capacity”, 109
AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 156, 156–57 (2016).
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officials for their acts while in office too.234 Under domestic law,
foreign-official immunity is governed by federal common law.235
Some lower courts have allowed claims to proceed against foreign
officials for acts “not arguably attributable to the state” and acts
in violation of jus cogens norms of international law.236 As part of
the common-law determination, courts generally defer to the
president’s suggestions of immunity.237 Nonetheless, “[d]isagreements persist about the appropriate role of the Executive Branch
in immunity determinations,” including its constitutional basis238
and how the president can confer or withdraw immunity.239
d) Act of state. Generally, U.S. courts refuse to judge the
validity of a foreign dictator’s official act “done within [his country’s] own territory.”240 This doctrine only applies when a court is
asked to “declare invalid, and thus ineffective as ‘a rule of decision
for the courts of this country,’ the official act of a foreign sovereign.”241 It therefore operates as a choice-of-law rule, forcing U.S.
courts to apply the law of the foreign state with regards to the
relevant act.242 The Supreme Court has justified this doctrine as
avoiding threats to “the amicable relations between governments
and vex[ing] the peace of nations.”243 Courts have stuck to this
doctrine regardless of the government in power.244 However,

234 Keitner, supra note 232, at 801. And diplomatic immunity is also its own category.
See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 31, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500
U.N.T.S. 95.
235 See Lewis S. Yelin, Head of State Immunity as Sole Executive Lawmaking, 44
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 911, 932–33, 983–86 (2011); Ingrid Wuerth, The Future of the
Federal Common Law of Foreign Relations, 106 GEO. L.J. 1825, 1834 (2018); Samantar,
560 U.S. at 311; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 66, 19
(AM. L. INST. 1965).
236 Samantar, 699 F.3d at 775. To be sure, there seems to be a circuit split on whether
there is a jus cogens exception to foreign-official immunity. Compare Samantar, 699 F.3d
at 775 (recognizing a jus cogens exception), and In re Est. of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d
1467, 1471–72 (9th Cir. 1994) (same), with Doğan v. Barak, 932 F.3d 888, 896 (9th Cir.
2019) (rejecting the argument for a jus cogens exception), and Belhas v. Ya’alon, 515 F.3d
1279, 1286–88 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (same).
237 See Zemin, 383 F.3d at 626–27.
238 Chimène I. Keitner, The Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 14 GREEN
BAG 2D 61, 71 (2010); Wuerth, supra note 113, at 926–28, 929, 967, 969–75.
239 See Keitner, supra note 238, at 72–73.
240 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 416 (quoting Underhill, 168 U.S. at 252).
241 W. S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Env’t Tectonics Corp., Int’l, 493 U.S. 400, 405 (1990)
(citation omitted) (quoting Ricaud v. Am. Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 310 (1918)); see, e.g.,
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 416.
242 See Harrison, supra note 23, at 564–66.
243 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 418 (quoting Oetjen, 246 U.S. at 303–04).
244 See infra Appendix B; see also Keitner, supra note 22, at 53–63.
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among other exceptions,245 U.S. courts “will not give extraterritorial effect to a foreign state’s confiscatory law.”246 In addition to
these foreign or external considerations, there are also concerns
with separation of powers built into the doctrine.
2. The State Department and the president.
The executive branch has the power to influence dictator
cases in a variety of ways. Most prominently, the president has
the power to recognize that a foreign regime “is the effective government of a state.”247 When the president recognizes either a foreign dictator or democratic government, such recognition confers
on that regime the power to benefit from sovereign immunity, the
privilege of filing suits in our courts, and “deference in domestic
courts under the act of state doctrine.”248 The sovereign-debt cases
discussed above—where two regimes claim to represent a country—
ultimately boil down to recognition disputes. As discussed above,
presidents have leveraged this power to weigh on the side of the
Kuomintang rather than the Mao regime in China249 as well as
Delvalle rather than Noriega in Panama.250 Moreover, the Second
Circuit recognizes a so-called Bernstein exception that allows the
president to request an exemption to the act of state doctrine.251
The executive has wavered in its influence on dictator cases,
sometimes pushing courts to open access for victims of dictatorships and at other times asking courts to grant foreign heads of
state immunity. In the fifty-seven cases cited above, the executive
provided some form of input less than half of the time (nineteen
cases), leaving courts without guidance in the majority of the
cases.252 But even when it intervened, it did not espouse a consistent position on dictators as litigants. For example, in act-ofstate cases like Bernstein and First National City Bank, the State
245 Such examples include the Bernstein exception and Hickenlooper Amendment. See
infra notes 251, 347.
246 Villoldo, 821 F.3d at 204. Courts can also sometimes defer to executive suggestions. See infra note 321. For an example of a dictator case in this context, see Republic of
Iraq v. First Nat’l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47, 49–51 (2d Cir. 1965).
247 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 203
cmt. A (AM. L. INST. 1987).
248 Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 11 (2015).
249 See supra text accompanying notes 140–45.
250 See supra text accompanying notes 74–79.
251 Bernstein, 210 F.2d at 376. The status of this exception is uncertain. See
RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 441 reporters’ n.13 (AM. L. INST. 2018).
252 See infra Appendix B.
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Department asked the Court to waive act of state for claims related to Nazi and Cuban expropriations. Courts complied with
this request.253 By contrast, in Sabbatino, the executive branch
did not take a position in the case, and the Court applied the act
of state doctrine.254 In the context of common-law immunities, the
executive suggests immunity in all sitting head-of-state cases.255
But this approach changes for former officials. That is why the
executive has sometimes supported victims’ claims against former
dictators like Marcos,256 but asked the court to give another former
head of state, Jiang Zemin, immunity.257 The executive has not
weighed in on most of the recent cases involving China, Russia,
Turkey, and Venezuela (other than by recognizing Venezuela’s
Juan Guaidó as president).
In the minority of cases where the executive intervenes,
courts almost always comply with executive requests. Some scholars have argued that executive suggestions of immunity are binding on the judiciary, while others have highlighted that courts always comply with Bernstein exception requests.258 On the whole,
it appears that courts are usually more conservative than the executive, waiting to take their cues from the political branches but
often left unguided.
***
This brief survey shows that foreign-dictator cases have
played an important role in the doctrines that comprise the domestic law on foreign relations. To be sure, dictator cases have
sometimes played second fiddle to the canonical cases in the context of recognition,259 the executive’s foreign affairs powers,260 sovereign immunity,261 or act of state doctrine.262 But dictator cases
have nonetheless left an important mark and have raised difficult
questions that remain unanswered.

253

See First Nat’l City Bank, 406 U.S. at 782; Bernstein, 210 F.2d at 376.
See generally Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398.
255 See Dodge & Keitner, supra note 53, at 36.
256 See supra text accompanying notes 178–83.
257 See supra text accompanying notes 185–88. For a more complete description, see
Dodge & Keitner, supra note 53, at 17–18.
258 See supra note 113.
259 See supra text accompanying notes 247–51.
260 See Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. at 310.
261 See Samantar, 560 U.S. at 309.
262 See Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 401.
254
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More speculatively, there may be a few reasons why dictator
cases arise often. First, to the extent that dictators gain power in
democracies, they probably violate rights more often than democratic officials, especially through property expropriations or human rights abuses.263 This not only creates disputes but also
forces dissidents to flee abroad.264 This logically gives rise to many
more cases in front of U.S. courts. Second, foreign dictatorships
are more likely to shut down or co-opt their own court systems,
giving aggrieved plaintiffs no access to court.265 In doing so, foreign dictatorships push these plaintiffs to file cases in the United
States.
D. The Problem of Foreign Dictators in U.S. Court
The cases above suggest problems facing U.S. courts that
can be grouped into the categories of dictators as plaintiffs or
defendants.
1. Dictators as plaintiffs.
It is quite easy for foreign dictators or their proxies to access
our courts. They benefit from the privilege of bringing suit and
can use it for both legitimate and illegitimate purposes. They can
also indirectly file claims through proxies, leaving few traces of
sovereign involvement. The Chinese Communist Party, Putin, or
Maduro can engage in harassment campaigns against opponents,
using U.S. discovery and other procedures to their advantage.
Even though the number of claims is small, litigation can have an
outsized chilling effect on opponents. Even a single case is enough
to cause concern.
2. Dictators as defendants.
Victims have a difficult time suing foreign dictators. Two
barriers are act of state doctrine and sovereign immunity. Even
in theory, these rules and statutory provisions provide cover for
the most egregious acts and, because of the equal-treatment
263 Cf. Yong Kyun Kim, States Sued: Democracy, the Rule of Law, and Investor-State
Dispute Settlement (ISDS), 43 INT’L INTERACTIONS 300, 307–08 (2017).
264 See, e.g., Jørgen Møller & Svend-Erik Skaaning, Autocracies, Democracies, and the
Violation of Civil Liberties, 20 DEMOCRATIZATION 82, 83–84, 87–88 (2013).
265 See Pierre Landry, The Institutional Diffusion of Courts in China: Evidence from
Survey Data, in RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 207,
217 (Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa eds., 2008); Martin Shapiro, Courts in Authoritarian Regimes, in RULE BY LAW, supra, at 326, 330–34.
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principle, remain neutral as to regime type. Another set of examples comes from recent act-of-state cases. In order to systematically review its impact, I collected seventy-six act-of-state cases
decided after the Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncement on
the doctrine in 1990.266 I found the following:
• Courts applied the act of state doctrine in at least twentyfive cases between 1991 and 2020, often to shield foreign
dictatorships.
• The act of state doctrine protected regimes in China, Russia,
Kazakhstan, Venezuela, Cuba, and Burma.267
To be sure, many democracies benefited too, including
Germany, Switzerland, Japan, Canada, and Mexico.268 But there
is little doubt that the conduct at issue in the dictatorship cases
presents a direct challenge to U.S. law and institutions. Examples
include a 2014 claim by a Chinese dissident against Cisco for
helping China build a nationwide surveillance program that led
to torture and arrests,269 a 2015 case by an abused and harassed
businessman against Hugo Chávez,270 and a 2014 case by Russia’s
Putin against a dissident businessman.271
Even when plaintiffs obtain judgments against foreign
dictators, one ever-present issue in all of these cases has been the
problem of enforcement. Plaintiffs armed with a judgment often
find it difficult to locate and attach assets belonging to foreign
sovereigns or dictators.272 Although enforcement of awards is beyond the scope of this Article, it remains a complex area with no
easy solutions.
3. The asymmetry.
Taking a broader view, problems with dictators as plaintiffs
or as defendants display the troubling asymmetry at the center of
this Article: foreign dictatorships can pursue their interests in
U.S. courts, but their opponents cannot sue them for similar
266 See Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 409–10. I focused on the most “relevant” cases tagged
by Westlaw that cited Kirkpatrick.
267 See infra Appendix B.
268 See infra Appendix B.
269 Du Daobin v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 2 F. Supp. 3d 717 (D. Md. 2014).
270 Mezerhane v. República Bolivariana de Venezuela, 785 F.3d 545 (11th Cir. 2015).
271 Fed. Treasury Enter. Sojuzplodoimport v. Spirits Int’l B.V., 809 F.3d 737 (2d Cir. 2016).
272 Under international law, immunity from execution is nearly absolute. See Stewart,
supra note 167, at 67; John F. Coyle, The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
in the Modern Era, 51 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 302, 339–40 (2013).
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concerns.273 To be sure, this asymmetry applies to all foreign
states, regardless of regime type. But the asymmetry has particularly worrisome consequences in dictator-related cases because
foreign authoritarians go on the offense against democratic opponents, newspapers, and dissidents in the United States. Return
to the example above: Venezuela can sue the Wall Street Journal
for a legitimate article on the government’s narcotrafficking links.
But U.S. journalists, nongovernmental organizations, Venezuelan dissidents, or former Venezuelan citizens cannot easily sue
the Venezuelan government in the United States because of sovereign or official immunity (as well as jurisdictional limits). Or,
for example, return again to the DNC’s suit against Russia for its
cyberattacks during the 2016 election. While Russia has pursued
dissidents in U.S. courts in a variety of ways, a judge recently
held that Russia was itself immune under the FSIA.274
There appear to be no cases of democracies taking advantage
of our courts this way. And, importantly, democracies usually give
Americans access to foreign court systems.275 Dictatorships, by
contrast, generally block any cases that have political implications. This lack of reciprocal access and willingness to exploit our
courts is what makes foreign dictators unique kinds of litigants.
Setting aside the FSIA and other immunities, doctrines that
benefit dictators, like act of state and the privilege of bringing
suit, are based on shaky premises that open them up to abuse or
manipulation. Although courts purportedly ground them in international comity and separation of powers, that seems like an unsatisfying justification. Perhaps, as Professors Cass Sunstein and
Eric Posner have argued, international comity is grounded in “a
rough assessment of the consequences” and a quasi-cost-benefit
analysis.276 This consequentialist calculation probably takes into
account foreign affairs and the “legitimacy and strength of the
American interests” in any particular case.277 That would explain
why in Camou—when Santa Anna was no longer in power—the
court was comfortable judging him as a “spasmodic” dictator, but

273 See infra text accompanying notes 444–47 for a discussion of the counterclaims
exception to the FSIA.
274 See Kleiner & Wolosky, supra note 28.
275 See Michael T. Lii, An Empirical Examination of the Adequate Alternative Forum
in the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 8 RICH. J. GLOB. L. & BUS. 513, 537–38 (2009).
276 Posner & Sunstein, supra note 56, at 1186.
277 Id.
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just a year earlier, in Underhill, the Court was wary of judging
the Venezuelan military leader that was still in power.278
While courts can make judgments about foreign affairs, they
remain wary of doing so. The concern, however, is that by abdicating this responsibility, courts may not fully account for the
costs of comity.
II. DOMESTIC LAW DOES NOT IMPOSE AN EQUAL-TREATMENT
PRINCIPLE FOR FOREIGN SOVEREIGNS
In this Part, I argue that U.S. courts need not recognize an
equal-treatment principle. Despite the long trend of cases treating
foreign sovereigns as equals under U.S. law—from The Sapphire
to Sabbatino—domestic law does not require courts to treat
foreign dictator claims like any other sovereign claims. Courts
have mistakenly assumed—and repeatedly affirmed—an equaltreatment principle that is not obligatory. Indeed, as Part II.B explains, a series of anticomity doctrines and statutes already force
U.S. courts to draw distinctions among foreign governments.
Although customary international law does require head-of-state
and official immunity that applies to all sovereigns,279 there are
also emerging doctrines on “odious debts” that allow unequal
treatment of foreign dictators. Either way, under customary international law there is “no clearly established general obligation
on a state not to differentiate between other states in the treatment it accords to them.”280 Finally, recent statutes and executive
initiatives support a judicial push against foreign autocrats.281
Before proceeding, let me first establish a stipulated premise:
U.S. courts should, if possible, avoid aiding foreign dictatorships.
Without engaging in an extended philosophical inquiry here,282
suffice it to say that foreign dictators challenge the goals and
foundations of a democratic polity (and its courts) as well as the
underlying justifications for international comity. In the United
States, our courts have defended international comity to foreign
sovereigns because it strengthens a community of nations that
wish to promote cooperation, free commerce, and reciprocal treatment.283 But even if most modern autocracies are not autarkic,
278
279
280
281
282
283

Underhill, 168 U.S. at 252–53.
See supra note 33; Dodge & Keitner, supra note 53, at 20.
1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 226, at 376.
See infra Part II.D.
For such a discussion, see supra notes 31–32.
See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1895).
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authoritarian governments are not reliable promoters of reciprocal judicial access.284 Dictators often bar our citizens from their
court systems and treat U.S. companies unfairly vis-à-vis their
domestic companies.285 Ultimately, the problem I highlight is a
pragmatic one: the manipulation or abuse of our legal system.
Dictators are using their privileges—as recognized by our institutions—to advance their authoritarian agendas.
If we accept that courts should refrain from helping foreign
dictators where possible, then the question becomes whether courts
are obligated—by the Constitution, the executive branch, or statute—to do otherwise. As I show below, there is no such obligation.
A. Domestic Law Allows Unequal Treatment
Courts are not generally bound by any statute, doctrine, or
constitutional principle to treat foreign dictators the same way as
they do other foreign governments. Let’s begin with Justice Joseph
Story’s maxim that “whatever force and obligation the laws of one
country have in another, depend[s] solely upon the laws and municipal regulations of the latter; that is to say, upon its own proper
jurisprudence and polity, and upon its own express or tacit consent.”286 This widely accepted maxim means that whatever respect U.S. courts owe to foreign countries is rooted in domestic
law—constitutional provisions, statutes, and common-law doctrines. But none of these three sources seems to impose an equaltreatment requirement on all types of government.
The Constitution certainly does not impose a requirement of
equal treatment. Article III provides that “[t]he judicial Power
shall extend to all Cases . . . between a State, or the Citizens
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.”287 But this provision hinges on whether the government recognizes a foreign entity as a “state” that can sue or be sued in U.S. courts and on
whether Congress authorizes subject-matter jurisdiction. These,
in turn, depend on executive or legislative acts.288 That is why
courts do not interpret Article III to mean that courts must give

284

Ginsburg, supra note 7, at 228–31.
Id. at 231–32, 237.
286 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 23 (Boston, Cambridge
Press 2d ed. 1841).
287 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
288 See U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 2–3.
285
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access to any foreign entity claiming to be a foreign state.289 Some
have argued that foreign states may have a constitutional right
to sue grounded not only in Article III but also in the First and Fifth
Amendments.290 Courts have mostly rejected this proposition.291
Even if true, courts have long denied the privilege of suit to “governments at war with the United States” and “those not recognized by this country.”292 This shows that there has never been a
textually grounded and inflexible equal-treatment principle.293
Moreover, courts have dismissed cases under doctrines like
forum non conveniens (FNC) and abstention, explicitly recognizing
that courts are not always constitutionally obligated to exercise
their jurisdiction.294 These categorical exceptions are the product of
a flexible interpretation of the Constitution that, again, undermines any textual grounding for an equal-treatment principle.
Statutes do not impose an obligation of equal treatment either,
except in the important context of foreign sovereign immunity. The
FSIA grants immunity to all “foreign states.”295 Courts have interpreted that phrase by either looking at the Restatement of Foreign
Relations—which itself considers a series of factors, including international law—or deferring to executive recognition of a foreign
entity as a state.296 In any case, courts have made clear that if an
entity is recognized as a state, immunity follows. Congress has
already made the choice that there shall not be discrimination by
type of government. There is, therefore, no room for singling out
dictatorships (unless the executive does not recognize them).
Even more, the FSIA’s exceptions are based on conduct—distinguishing among states that sponsor terrorism, states that engage

289 This is true even though the diversity jurisdiction statute covers claims by “a foreign state, [as defined by the FSIA] . . . and the citizens of a State.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(4)
(2012). But see King of Spain v. Oliver, 14 F. Cas. 577, 579 (C.C.D. Pa. 1810) (No. 7814).
290 See Wuerth, supra note 54, at 688.
291 See id. at 643 nn.48–49 (collecting cases).
292 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 409.
293 These exceptions also show that an equal-treatment principle cannot be rooted in
treaties of friendship which sometimes guarantee access to court. See Coyle, supra note 272,
at 318–25. It’s not even clear whether these treaties apply to government litigants at all.
294 Dodge, supra note 56, at 2109–10. However, courts have always held that they can
decline to exercise jurisdiction. See Louisiana v. Mississippi, 488 U.S. 990, 990 (1988). But
see Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976) (noting
that courts have a “virtually unflagging obligation” to exercise jurisdiction).
295 28 U.S.C. § 1604.
296 See O’Bryan v. Holy See, 556 F.3d 361, 372 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 201 (AM. L. INST. 1987)); see also RESTATEMENT
(FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 452 (AM. L. INST. 2018).
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in commercial activities, and states that waive immunity.297 By
singling out some kinds of states based on conduct (not status)
but not others, the statute removes any judicial flexibility to treat
countries differently.
While the FSIA imposes an equal-treatment principle, the
Act does not extend to most of the doctrines that matter in this
context: the privilege of bringing suit, act of state recognition, or
head-of-state and official immunity. These doctrines are instead
mostly governed by principles of international comity, which are
not “a matter of absolute obligation” under constitutional or
international law.298 The array of doctrines that emerge out of
international comity is subject to judicial interpretation and has
undergone dramatic change over time. That is why the privilege
of bringing suit in U.S. courts is, after all, a privilege—one that is
subject to control by courts, Congress, and the executive. And that
is also why courts exempt countries at war with the United States
and those that the executive does not recognize. Simply stated,
principles of international comity do not impose an equal-treatment
obligation at all.
B. The Anticomity Doctrines Allow Unequal Treatment
An array of anticomity doctrines underlines courts’ existing
flexibility in the context of the privilege of bringing suit, act of
state recognition, and foreign-official immunity. Scholars and
courts have long recognized situations where U.S. courts can
refuse to enforce foreign government actions and can draw distinctions between regimes.299 As some have noted, U.S. courts
judge the quality of foreign laws and legal systems.300 For instance, U.S. courts “refuse to enforce a foreign judgment or
foreign law if doing so would violate American public policy.”301
In conflict-of-law analyses as well, courts reject foreign laws that
conflict with U.S. public policy.
One important instance in which courts judge the quality of
foreign legal systems is in the area of foreign judgment
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28 U.S.C. §§ 1602, 1605(a).
Guyot, 159 U.S. at 163–64.
299 See Zachary D. Clopton, Judging Foreign States, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 19–22
(2016); Peter B. Rutledge, Toward a Functional Approach to Sovereign Equality, 53 VA. J.
INT’L L. 181, 185–88 (2012).
300 See Clopton, supra note 299, at 19–22.
301 Posner & Sunstein, supra note 56, at 1185.
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recognition and enforcement.302 Parties who obtain judgments in
a foreign judicial system can domesticate those judgments in U.S.
court by filing a recognition claim (governed by state law). Facing
those kinds of claims, U.S. courts have unequivocally held that
they “will not enforce judgments that result from an unfair system or an unfair process.”303 Importantly, courts scrutinize foreign
judicial systems—evaluating whether they provide due process
protections, are corrupt, or are dominated by authoritarian governments. For instance, in Osorio v. Dole Food Co.,304 the district
court refused to enforce a Nicaraguan award because it found,
among other things, that the country had a corrupt judicial system subject to authoritarian interference.305 Drawing from State
Department reports, the court explicitly discriminated against
the Nicaraguan system because of its authoritarian nature:
The weak state of the Nicaraguan judiciary is largely the result of a compromising pact between the country’s two
strongmen, Daniel Ortega and Arnoldo Alemán, who lead
Nicaragua’s two main political parties, the FSLN and the
PLC. Pursuant to the pact, these two men divide control of key
governmental institutions, including the Nicaraguan Supreme
Court, along partisan lines.306
This kind of judgment of a foreign state is unusual, but it shows
that courts can take into account the quality of a foreign regime.307
In rare cases, courts have also refused to grant FNC because
foreign countries were under a repressive government.308 During
an FNC motion, courts must analyze the adequacy of a potential
foreign forum. In doing so, judges have taken into account
whether the forum is located in an autocratic country. For example, in Canadian Overseas Ores Ltd. v. Compania de Acero Del
302 Christopher A. Whytock & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens
and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1444, 1462–63 (2011);
Linda J. Silberman & Aaron D. Simowitz, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments and Awards: What Hath Daimler Wrought?, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 344, 354 (2016).
303 Clopton, supra note 299, at 13.
304 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307 (S.D. Fla. 2009), aff’d sub nom. Osorio v. Dow Chem. Co., 635
F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2011).
305 Id. at 1351–52.
306 Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1348. Ortega, incidentally, falls into the dictatorship
bucket under the Polity IV score. See generally CTR. FOR SYSTEMIC PEACE, POLITY IV
COUNTRY REPORT 2010: NICARAGUA (2011), https://perma.cc/9TAA-MXVA.
307 See also Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406, 1411 (9th Cir. 1995); Bridgeway
Corp. v. Citibank, 45 F. Supp. 2d 276, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff’d, 201 F.3d 134 (2d Cir.
2000); Clopton, supra note 299, at 19–22.
308 See Clopton, supra note 299, at 19–20.
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Pacifico S.A.,309 a case involving a Chilean mining company, the
court rejected an FNC motion to dismiss because there were “serious questions about the independence of the Chilean judiciary
vis a vis the [Pinochet] military junta currently in power.”310 In
Rasoulzadeh v. Associated Press,311 the court rejected an FNC motion because it had “no confidence whatsoever in the plaintiffs’
ability to obtain justice at the hands of the courts administered by Iranian mullahs.”312 In one case involving a suit against
Azerbaijan’s autocratic government, a court refused to grant an
FNC motion because of the “extent of control wielded by the executive branch of the Azeri government—a party to th[e] litigation—over the Azeri courts.”313 Based on some of these cases, a
California court explicitly found a dictatorship exception to FNC
motions.314
None of these cases is neutral to regime type. They instead
exemplify the authority of U.S. courts to discriminate against
dictatorships. To be sure, courts’ analyses in these cases consider
both the conduct of foreign states and their status (or regime
type). So, in a way, they use a mixed analysis. Still, one article
claims to have found that a country’s record on political rights
and civil liberties is significantly correlated with the likelihood
that a court grants an FNC motion.315 According to that article,
courts find that countries with high rates of political liberties (i.e.,
liberal democracies) can more often provide an adequate forum
than countries with low rates of political liberties (i.e., autocracies).316 Although the article’s data are outdated and limited, if its
main finding is correct, it is evidence of unequal treatment.
Even when the anticomity doctrines are neutral as to regime
type generally, courts can still weigh democratic principles and
U.S. interests against deference to foreign acts or laws in a
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528 F. Supp. 1337 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff’d, 727 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1984).
528 F. Supp. at 1342.
311 574 F. Supp. 854, 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff’d, 767 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1985).
312 574 F. Supp. at 861 (noting further “that if the plaintiffs returned to Iran to prosecute this claim, they would probably be shot”).
313 Daventree Ltd. v. Republic of Azerbaijan, 349 F. Supp. 2d 736, 756 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
314 See Shiley Inc. v. Superior Ct. of Orange Cnty., 4 Cal. App. 4th 126, 133–34 (1992);
see also Phx. Can. Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 445, 455–56 (D. Del. 1978) (refusing
an FNC motion because Ecuador was ruled by a military government).
315 See Lii, supra note 275, at 537–38.
316 See id. at 537–39.
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particular context.317 For example, a court recently denied an FNC
motion because Saudi Arabian sex-discrimination laws offend
“the notion of equality before the law on which the American system of justice is premised.”318 In the anticomity context, courts
differentiate by government types, judging the kind of legal protection provided by foreign regimes.
The act of state doctrine has exceptions that recognize U.S.
interests as well. Alongside the development of a robust case law
on act of state, courts have also held that they “will not give extraterritorial effect to a foreign state’s confiscatory law.”319 Suppose, for instance, that a communist dictatorship seeks to expropriate any funds owned by a particular dissident, wherever those
funds may be located. If that dictatorship seeks to freeze and seize
funds deposited in a U.S. bank, courts will refuse to enforce that
order. Applying this exception, in 1965, the Second Circuit refused
to enforce an expropriation order by Iraq’s military leader that
sought to seize funds in the United States.320 The court justified this
holding because the order was “contrary to our public policy and
shocking to our sense of justice,” noting that “[o]ur Constitution sets
itself against confiscations such as that decreed.”321 Even if this
analysis is based on sovereign conduct, and not regime type, it
nonetheless recognizes the ability of U.S. courts to reject foreign
dictatorial acts.
These cases and doctrines embody a simple principle: courts
can treat foreign countries differently and can judge foreign
dictatorial regimes, especially when dictators challenge U.S. constitutional rights. Still, these cases are rare, and courts remain
reluctant to draw distinctions among regimes. As I argue below,
focusing on regime type can be difficult to administer and therefore calls for alternative tools.

317 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 90 (AM. L. INST. 1971). Mark
Jia has argued that U.S. courts have embraced an “anti-authoritarian” bias in many contexts. Jia, supra note 7, at 1722–24.
318 Petersen v. Boeing Co., 108 F. Supp. 3d 726, 732 (D. Ariz. 2015).
319 Villoldo v. Castro Ruz, 821 F.3d 196, 204 (1st Cir. 2016).
320 See Republic of Iraq v. First Nat’l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47, 50–51 (2d Cir. 1965).
321 Id. at 51–52 (quotation marks omitted). Of course, this exception may itself be
subject to an exception “if this were a case in which the executive branch was urging us to
give extraterritorial effect in this country to the foreign nation’s confiscatory law.” Villoldo,
821 F.3d at 202–03.
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C. The Original Justifications for International Comity
Allowed Unequal Treatment
While Sabbatino seems to be the major reason that courts treat
foreign dictatorships as they do other litigants, the case was based
on outdated premises. Sabbatino held that principles of comity extend to all foreign sovereigns recognized by the United States, regardless of their form of government.322 But the decision wrongly
dismissed the original foundations of comity for two reasons.
First, the Court improperly set aside reciprocity arguments.
As discussed above, the Supreme Court’s original formulation of
comity in Hilton v. Guyot323 relied almost entirely on the concept
of reciprocity.324 In the face of this language, Sabbatino cabined
reciprocity to only the “conclusiveness of judgments, and even
then only in limited circumstances.”325 But prior to Sabbatino, a
few courts cited Guyot as standing for a broader principle of reciprocity.326 Even after Sabbatino, Justices have defended comity
outside of judgment enforcement as a “principle under which judicial decisions reflect the systemic value of reciprocal tolerance.”327 Requiring reciprocity makes sense because it promotes
fairness and equal treatment. Reciprocity incentivizes foreign
states to give U.S. citizens access to courts, and it sanctions those
that refuse by removing U.S. judicial recognition. Sabbatino’s aggressive dispatch of reciprocity as a prerequisite was a kind of
unilateral disarmament. The Supreme Court allowed foreign governments to bar the U.S. government and U.S. citizens from their
court systems without any consequences.
Second, international comity doctrines have always been mediated by considerations of public policy. As Justice Story noted
long ago, “No nation can . . . be required to sacrifice its own interests in favor of another; or to enforce doctrines, which, in a moral,
or political view, are incompatible with its . . . conscientious regard to justice and duty.”328 These considerations go beyond the
foreign policy preferences of the executive. Judges could ask in
322

See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 408–09.
159 U.S. 113 (1895).
324 See id. at 163–64, 227–28.
325 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 411.
326 See Hempel v. Weedin, 23 F.2d 949, 956 (W.D. Wash.), rev’d, 28 F.2d 603 (9th Cir.
1928); Universal Adjustment Corp. v. Midland Bank, Ltd., 184 N.E. 152, 160 (Mass. 1933).
327 Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the S. Dist. of Iowa,
482 U.S. 522, 555 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
328 STORY, supra note 286, § 25.
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dictator cases whether comparable acts by domestic actors would
be unconstitutional. Such an inquiry could cover acts that we currently accept but are actually anathema to U.S. public policy. In
determining these questions, judges could easily rely on existing
constitutional doctrines.
D. The Political Branches Are Allowing Courts to Relax the
Equal-Treatment Principle
While Congress has long embraced the equal-treatment principle in statutes like the FSIA, a recent series of new statutes and
executive branch initiatives may signal a push against foreign authoritarian governments. Of course, the political branches are explicitly empowered to make determinations about foreign policy
and have always made political decisions about foreign regimes.
So we should be wary of drawing explicit links between political
and judicial approaches. But these new initiatives offer two lessons: (1) by allowing claims against certain autocratic regimes,
they push the judiciary to host cases against foreign autocrats,
and (2) they create tools and space for the judiciary to understand
how to judge foreign dictatorships.
1. Executive initiatives against autocrats.
The State Department and DOJ have created tools that allow
the judiciary to discriminate against foreign autocrats and, potentially, to abandon the equal-treatment principle. For instance, the
State Department produces a set of Country Reports on human
rights practices abroad.329 These reports explicitly call out not just
human rights violations but political and dictatorial power grabs
as well. And the reports can indirectly lead to the withdrawal of
aid to certain countries.330 Courts have drawn on these reports in
the judgment-enforcement and FNC contexts to examine whether
a foreign country respects due process or democratic norms.331 In
one case, the court used these reports to find that while Costa

329 Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices, U.S. DEP’T STATE,
https://perma.cc/R2MW-XUWD.
330 See id.; cf. Peter Chalk, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross & Colin P. Clarke, Can Sudan
Escape Its History as a Transit Hub for Violent Extremist Organizations, FOREIGN POL’Y
RSCH. INST. (July 23, 2020), https://perma.cc/MN4L-7ZL6 (identifying Sudan’s label as a state
sponsor of terror in the Country Report as a reason for the United States withholding aid).
331 See supra text accompanying notes 299–314.
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Rica had an independent judiciary and fair trials, the Philippines
and Honduras could not provide a fair forum.332
More relevantly, the DOJ now treats foreign corrupt regimes
differently through KARI. Attorney General Eric Holder created
the initiative in 2010, premised on the idea that foreign corrupt
governments were taking advantage of the United States to store
“ill-gotten” gains.333 KARI attempts to stymie efforts by foreign
governments to use the United States as a safe haven for corrupt
money by empowering the DOJ to pursue forfeiture complaints.
Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer explicitly defended the
initiative as a way to avoid sovereign or official immunity.334 Under KARI, DOJ prosecutors find and seize these United States–
based assets through civil forfeiture actions in U.S. court.335 Following civil forfeiture, the DOJ can repatriate this money to the
country or individuals from which it was taken.
KARI stands for the principle that, as a matter of executive
policy and DOJ discretion, foreign kleptocracies deserve special
prosecutorial and judicial attention. The initiative has pursued
nearly thirty cases and, unsurprisingly, has mostly focused on foreign dictators.336 One of the most celebrated cases includes a 2020
civil forfeiture agreement covering $311.7 million in assets that
were traceable to the former Nigerian dictator Sani Abacha and his
co-conspirators.337 Indeed, the DOJ announcement emphasizes
that Abacha was a “dictator” and ruled over a “military regime.”338
KARI exemplifies a broader trend over the past few decades
of facilitating claims against foreign dictatorships. To be sure, litigation, diplomacy, and criminal enforcement are vastly different
enterprises, so we should be wary of drawing direct links here.
The State Department and DOJ may feel comfortable launching
criminal or diplomatic initiatives that should not be replicated
within the judiciary. There is, after all, a difference between
332 See Canales Martinez v. Dow Chem. Co., 219 F. Supp. 2d 719, 735, 738, 741 (E.D.
La. 2002).
333 Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., Remarks at the Ukraine Forum on Asset Recovery (Apr.
29, 2014), https://perma.cc/CQ4M-ERSL; Wayne, supra note 17.
334 See Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the Crim. Div. of the Dep’t of Just.,
Franz-Hermann Brüner Memorial Lecture at the World Bank (May 25, 2011),
https://perma.cc/7VZZ-SHPW.
335 See id.
336 Wayne, supra note 17.
337 OFF. OF PUB. AFFS., U.S. Repatriates over $311.7 Million in Assets to the Nigerian
People That Were Stolen by Former Nigerian Dictator and His Associates, DEP’T JUST.
(May 4, 2020), https://perma.cc/C2UG-GHWK.
338 Id.
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Articles II and III. Nonetheless, this Section aims to highlight
that one legal trend of the past few decades is to funnel more of
these dictator cases into U.S. courts.
2. Congressional initiatives.
Statutes or congressional amendments like the Torture Victim
Protection Act of 1991,339 JASTA, Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996340 (AEDPA), and the Hickenlooper
Amendment—as well as the Alien Tort Statute—have specifically
targeted states that sponsor terrorism, violate international law,
or illegally expropriate property.341 While parts of these statutes
are facially neutral, they increasingly funnel authoritarian states
and officials into the U.S. legal system. This approach—along
with older FSIA exceptions—perhaps shows Congress’s intent to
weaken sovereign immunity in order to hold illiberal foreign regimes liable. Courts can draw from these principles to inform the
common law of foreign relations.
Scholars like Wuerth have argued that foreign relations doctrines are best justified as common law that “give[s] effect to very
closely related statutory frameworks.”342 In other words, the doctrines emerge to support and sustain statutes like the FSIA. The
FSIA, for instance, does not directly govern foreign-official immunity, but that doctrine could emerge out of the statute because “[t]he
purpose of individual immunities is to protect foreign states by
protecting the officials who work on their behalf.”343 Even the act of
state doctrine may itself be justified by the FSIA and Hickenlooper
Amendment.344
If Wuerth is right, then courts should interpret international
comity in light of recent congressional trends. Again, one of these
trends is Congress’s increasing willingness to target wrongful
acts by illiberal foreign regimes. For instance, JASTA expanded
the scope of the FSIA exception for foreign state sponsors of terrorism, opening up a flurry of claims against Saudi Arabia. Specifically, the Act removes immunity and provides a cause of action

339

28 U.S.C. § 1350.
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254).
341 See, e.g., De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicar., 770 F.2d 1385, 1395 (5th Cir.
1985); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c).
342 Wuerth, supra note 235, at 1850; see also Clark, supra note 38, at 1263. But see
Goldsmith, supra note 38, at 1632–33 (arguing against the common law).
343 Wuerth, supra note 235, at 1852.
344 See id. at 1854.
340
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for claims against states aiding and abetting “an act of international terrorism in the United States.”345 Although broadly
worded, the Act was aimed at claims against Saudi Arabia for
providing support to al-Qaeda. This Act is just one of many congressional acts that, while neutral as to regime type, have a disparate impact on foreign autocratic regimes by increasing the
number of cases involving foreign dictatorships in U.S. courts. It is
no coincidence that claims under these statutes involve countries
like Iran, Sudan, and Syria, rather than countries like Taiwan or
Peru. While the statutes are de jure neutral, they are de facto
attacks on autocracies.
The relationship between statutes and the common law of foreign relations raises the question of whether courts should be proactive or reactive in this context. On the one hand, Congress has
shown that it can respond to specific cases by withholding immunity to foreign states. It did this through JASTA, the Hickenlooper
Amendment, and the AEDPA.346 Instead of taking affirmative action on their own, courts could reasonably construe claims narrowly and wait for congressional acts to override them. A posture
of judicial reactivity has the benefit of deferring to the political
branches. On the other hand, perhaps these statutes support a
broader principle that courts should be willing to host cases
against foreign autocrats. The thread is arguably similar: certain
claims should proceed in the United States against foreign governments that challenge liberal norms.
Although both conclusions are reasonable, the broader lesson
is that courts can be proactive in this context. Even the legislative
history of the statutes shows some impatience with courts’ unwillingness to allow claims against foreign governments, not frustration with judicial activism.347 This legislative history supports
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28 U.S.C. § 1605B(b)(1).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1605; 22 U.S.C. § 2370I(2); 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
347 Senator Bourke Hickenlooper sponsored the amendment that overturned Sabbatino
because Congress and U.S. courts needed to take action “to stop that kind of nonsense, or to
see that payment is made for property when it is seized, we shall see a wave of expropriations
of property of Americans going throughout the world like a prairie fire.” 108 CONG. REC.
9,940 (June 7, 1962) (statement of Sen. Hickenlooper). Similarly, Representative Bob
Goodlatte justified JASTA because U.S. courts’ dismissal of claims against foreign sponsors
of terrorism for jurisdictional deficiencies was a “troubling loophole in our antiterrorism laws
. . . . [C]ourts have not consistently interpreted [FSIA] exceptions in such a manner that
they cover the sponsoring of a terrorist attack on U.S. soil.” 162 CONG. REC. H5,241 (daily
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Id. at H5,242 (statement of Rep. Nadler). See also 162 CONG. REC. S2,846 (daily ed. May
346

2022]

Foreign Dictators in U.S. Court

211

a proactive position that innovates and promotes the goals of existing statutes. Moreover, these are fundamental questions about
court access, not foreign affairs. The relevant questions are about
immunity from suit or choice of law—not about diplomacy. As
courts and the literature have moved away from foreign affairs
exceptionalism, there is a broader understanding that these cases
should be treated more like domestic cases. And domestic doctrines
would allow more claims against dictators rather than grant
immunity or act of state protection.
E. The Odious Debt Doctrine Allows Unequal Treatment
Although it is not part of customary international law, the
would-be doctrine of odious debts may also support the unequal
treatment of autocracies vis-à-vis other government types.348 Ordinarily, international law holds that new regimes inherit any
debts incurred by previous regimes in control of the same territory.349 Debts, in other words, are incurred by sovereigns, not regimes. But the doctrine of odious debts—to the extent we can call
it a doctrine—provides an exception.350 It holds that debts incurred during the rule of a “despotic power” do not necessarily
bind successor democratic regimes,351 who may choose to repudiate these previous debts.352 The modern literature on odious debt
focuses in particular on applying the doctrine to dictatorial, authoritarian, and corrupt regimes.353 Despite a long history, the
17, 2016) (statement of Sen. Schumer) (“The courts in New York have dismissed the 9/11
victims’ claims against certain foreign entities alleged to have helped fund the 9/11
attacks. These courts are following what we believe is a nonsensical reading of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act.”). Even the little history that we have on the Alien Tort Statute
reveals that the Statute was born out of the First Congress’s “embarrass[ment]” at its
“inability to provide judicial relief” in two international incidents involving foreign diplomats. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 123 (2013).
348 Other international law doctrines may support this, including the idea of an international right to democratic governance. See ROTH, supra note 73, at 1.
349 See Patrick Bolton & David Skeel, Odious Debts or Odious Regimes, 70 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 102 (2007); see also Mitu Gulati & Ugo Panizza, The Hausmann-Gorky
Effect, 166 J. BUS. ETHICS 175, 175 (2020).
350 See Lee C. Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati & Robert B. Thompson, The Dilemma of Odious Debts, 56 DUKE L.J. 1201, 1216 (2007).
351 See id. at 1216–19.
352 See id. at 1218.
353 See Andrew Yianni & David Tinkler, Is There a Recognized Legal Doctrine of Odious Debts?, 32 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 749, 750 (2007); Jeff A. King, Odious Debt: The
Terms of the Debate, 32 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 605, 624, 632 (2007); Christiana
Ochoa, From Odious Debt to Odious Finance: Avoiding the Externalities of a Functional
Odious Debt Doctrine, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 109, 111–12 (2008); Seema Jayachandran &
Michael Kremer, Odious Debt, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 82, 83–85, 87–89 (2006).
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doctrine is not established in customary international law but remains important only in discourse around sovereign debt.354
Even though it is not established, the would-be odious debt
doctrine provides at least partial support for unequal treatment
of foreign dictators. While the role of international law within federal common law is strongly contested, most scholars would agree
that courts can use it as “one interpretive tool . . . without relying
on it as controlling.”355 The most important lesson to draw here is
the simple fact that dictatorial regimes should not always be recognized as normal by domestic or international institutions.
***
All the above suggests that courts can treat foreign dictatorships differently. The analysis is necessarily one-sided because it
focuses on counterarguments to the current status quo. But this
is a robust combination. No statute or constitutional provision
mandates equal treatment of all foreign regimes. And a series of
doctrines and decisions actually allows discrimination against
foreign dictatorial governments, including the anticomity doctrines,
the original justifications of international comity, congressional
statutes, executive programs like KARI, and the odious debt
doctrine. Finally, harmful consequences to foreign affairs appear
to be highly unlikely. And yet, as argued below, there may be
other reasons to maintain the status quo.
III. AN ANTIDICTATORSHIP STANDARD IS LIKELY NOT
ADMINISTRABLE AND RUNS INTO THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
If there is no equal-treatment obligation, one way to remedy
the foreign dictators’ asymmetry is to withhold foreign relations
protections and privileges whenever a dictator is a litigant. At first
blush, this seems like an attractive option as it would weaken the
equal-treatment principle, promote democratic values, and prevent foreign tyrants from abusing our courts. But this would also
force courts to face difficult administrability and separation-ofpowers challenges.
In this Part, I argue that courts should not implement an antidictatorship exception to international comity. Part III.A shows
354 See King, supra note 353, at 633–37, 642–48; Jayachandran & Kremer, supra note
353, at 85–87.
355 Wuerth, supra note 113, at 961; see also William S. Dodge, Customary International Law and the Question of Legitimacy, 120 HARV. L. REV. F. 19, 20–21 (2007).
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that an antidictatorship exception would force courts to decide on
a case-by-case basis whether a dictatorship deserves equal treatment or not, bumping heads against the State Department.
Courts may also be forced to evaluate foreign policy consequences
of dictator-related decisions, weakening deference to the executive.356 These and other functionalist problems make one conclusion clear: it would be unfeasible to categorically discriminate
against foreign dictatorships. Part III.B then considers an analogous context where U.S. courts retain a doctrine of neutral applicability that nonetheless polices foreign government abuse: the
political offense exception to extradition. This doctrine could be a
model for reforms, showing that courts can judge dictatorships by
the types of cases they file.357
A. The Problems of Judicial Administrability and the
Separation of Powers
The literature on foreign affairs has long recognized the executive branch’s advantage over the judiciary in this context,
mostly based on questions of expertise, speed, flexibility, and secrecy.358 Those justifications mostly do cash out in the dictator
context, but we may additionally worry about the high error costs
of misjudging a foreign dictatorship and the possibility, even if
unlikely, of foreign strife.359 The political branches have also
shown willingness to intervene in this area by, for example, creating exceptions to the act of state doctrine or wielding the recognition power.360 Beyond these separation-of-powers and institutional competence points, at least five reasons render an
antidictatorship standard unworkable.
First, there is no easy way for courts to determine whether a
foreign government is a dictatorship. While the executive can
count on an array of institutional information sources, the judiciary generally shies away from these ad hoc determinations. In the
particular context of dictatorships, courts face a series of difficulties that are the source of vast disagreements in political science.
An entire recent literature has struggled to categorize new authoritarian governments that nonetheless retain a patina of

356
357
358
359
360

See Maggie Gardner, Parochial Procedure, 69 STAN. L. REV. 941, 954–58 (2017).
See supra Part I.
See Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 56, at 1936–42.
See id. at 1910.
I thank Curtis Bradley for some of the specifics here.
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democracy.361 There is a veritable word soup of names for these
regimes, including competitive authoritarian, hybrid regimes,
semidemocracy, transitioning democracy, illiberal democracy,
and soft authoritarianism.362 The analysis may be unduly burdensome and unwieldy for parties and judges.
To be sure, in the foreign-judgment-enforcement context,
courts have developed ways to judge due process in foreign judicial
systems. Courts can count on expert reports, State Department
guidance, and evidence on the totalitarian nature of a foreign
regime or its abuse of judicial process. Return, for example, to
Osorio, where the court drew directly on the work of the State
Department and international NGOs, including Country Reports
prepared by experts at the U.S. State Department, Freedom
House, Global Integrity Scorecard, Transparency International,
U.S. ambassadors, and credible Nicaraguan authorities.363
Clearly, courts have some ability and procedures to make these
judgments.364
Despite the foreign-enforcement example, there is no easy
way to generalize that kind of process to every case involving foreign dictators. One problem is that courts could frustrate uniformity in the process, with some district court judges calling a
foreign sovereign a dictatorship and others disagreeing. Another
potential problem is that, while courts are well suited to evaluate
due process violations, they lack expertise in judging regime types.
Therefore, the foreign-judgment-enforcement context, as Sabbatino
recognized, may not be analogous to areas like the privilege of
bringing suit, which is “a problem more sensitive politically.”365
Second, even if courts could distinguish among different types
of government, it’s not even clear that the relevant category of
analysis should be regime type or “dictatorships.” Some dictator
cases are problematic because they fundamentally challenge basic
human rights, democratic values, and sometimes involve abuse of
legal process to promote autocracy. But focusing on dictators
or dictatorships would be underinclusive. Democratic governments can also litigate problematic cases. That is why U.S. courts
361 See, e.g., Steven Levitsky & Lucan A. Way, The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism, 13 J. DEMOCRACY 51, 51–54 (2002).
362 See id.
363 Osorio, 665 F. Supp. at 1348–49.
364 To be sure, the Eleventh Circuit refused to endorse the lower court’s analysis as
to whether the tribunals of Nicaragua were impartial. See Osorio v. Dow Chem. Co., 635
F.3d 1277, 1279 (11th Cir. 2011).
365 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 412.
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have previously refused to enforce libel awards from the United
Kingdom.366 Moreover, although rare, it is possible that some foreign dictatorships may respect fundamental rights more than
weak democracies. For instance, Singapore’s authoritarian government may respect certain rights more than Brazil’s backsliding democracy. It would therefore be underinclusive to discriminate against foreign dictatorships by allowing similarly egregious
acts performed by democracies in U.S. courts.
Third, proxies or other officials have filed some of the most
egregious claims, hiding the potential involvement of a foreign regime. That has been true of claims by China, Venezuela, Russia,
and Turkey. Although, as I argue below, courts can disentangle
when proxies are litigating on behalf of foreign regimes, it would
also be time consuming for courts to routinely scrutinize whether
a foreign plaintiff is truly filing on their own behalf or as a proxy
of a foreign government.
Fourth, discriminating against dictatorships for all claims
would also be substantively overinclusive. Dictatorships can, and
do, file legitimate claims. Suppose that Venezuela’s authoritarian
government enters into a series of contracts with a U.S. construction company that include choice-of-law and choice-of-forum
clauses that point to U.S. courts. Suppose the company then refuses to perform under the contracts but nonetheless retains payment. Surely, U.S. courts should be available for such a claim,
even if it is filed in the name of Venezuela’s dictator. This is the
type of claim where the United States retains an interest in disciplining domestic companies and enforcing the relevant contract
laws. That is also true for the routine kinds of tort claims that
involve foreign government officials in the United States (e.g.,
embassy officials that are involved in traffic accidents). Or suppose that a dictatorial regime—say an ally like Kuwait—brought
bona fide claims against somebody who engaged in corruption and
then fled to the United States.367 Discriminating against Kuwait
just because it is governed by an authoritarian regime would be
too blunt of an instrument. Again, it would be overinclusive for
courts to categorically shut their doors to these types of claims.
Finally, foreign-policy judgments in this context are unusually
complex. The United States is sometimes allied with foreign
dictatorships and at odds with democracies. As mentioned above,

366
367

See Bachchan v. India Abroad Publ’ns Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661, 664 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992).
I thank Allen Weiner for this example.
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President Roosevelt’s apocryphal quip about Somoza being “our
son of a bitch” captures the difficulty of judging foreign dictators.368
Even among the political branches, there are disputes over sovereign immunity. Often, Congress is eager to make a symbolic show
of support for U.S. victims by stripping foreign countries of immunity. The executive, by contrast, usually disagrees with statutes
like JASTA—which was vetoed by President Barack Obama—and
other congressional efforts to disrupt foreign relations.369
The most troubling cases discussed above—involving Turkey,
Venezuela, and Russia—also raise these concerns. Maduro’s
Venezuela would clearly fall into the bucket of foreign dictatorships that we need not host in our courts. As if to make this an
easy question, the DOJ recently indicted Maduro.370 But Turkey
is in a different category. Although helmed by a foreign dictator,
Turkey is also a NATO ally. And Russia is likely our largest geopolitical rival, but it may take greater offense to judicial rejection.
It would be difficult to impose these foreign policy calculations on
district court judges.
All these problems make one conclusion clear: whatever rule
we wish to create to avoid aiding foreign dictatorships runs the
danger of being over- or underinclusive. We should therefore look
for different ways to target these cases, perhaps focusing on the
type of claim or the relevant doctrine at issue (e.g., act of state)
rather than type of litigant. We need not judge foreign dictatorships qua dictatorships. We should instead judge foreign dictatorships when they perform acts that violate U.S. public policy and
commitments to liberal democracy.
B. A Possible Model: The Political Offense Exception
One alternative to an antidictatorship standard would be a
regime-neutral approach that focuses on political abuse, similar
to the political-offense exception to extradition.371 Most countries,
368 See, e.g., Ope Shipping, Ltd. v. Allstate Ins., 521 F. Supp. 342, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1981),
aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 687 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1982).
369 See Bravin, supra note 20; Helen Kim, The Errand Boy’s Revenge: Helms-Burton
and the Supreme Court’s Response to Congress’s Abrogation of the Act of State Doctrine, 48
EMORY L.J. 305, 305 (1999). I thank Curtis Bradley for this insight.
370 See Aruna Viswanatha, José de Córdoba & Ian Talley, U.S. Charges Venezuelan
President Nicolás Maduro with Drug Trafficking, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 26, 2020),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-indicts-venezuelan-president-nicolas-maduro-on-allegations
-of-drug-trafficking-11585236443
371 See CHRISTINE VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, THE POLITICAL OFFENCE EXCEPTION TO
EXTRADITION 100–02 (1980); Ginsburg, supra note 7, at 253.
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including the United States, participate in an array of bilateral
extradition treaties that allow sovereigns to “demand and obtain
extradition of an accused criminal.”372 But the “political offense
exception” allows courts to refuse extradition on the grounds that
the foreign sovereign has charged the defendant with offenses “of
a political character.”373
Some commentators have argued that the political offense exception “can be traced to the rise of democratic governments” and
was “designed to protect the right to rebel against tyrannical governments.”374 For example, Professor Thomas Carbonneau argued
that “[b]y invoking the political offense exception when confronted with extradition requests from despotic governments,
democratic States could proffer protection to political dissenters
and thus indirectly promote democratic tendencies.”375 Drawing
from this history, some courts have defined the test as looking at
whether the defendants’ acts “were blows struck in the cause of
freedom against a repressive totalitarian regime.”376 The Seventh
Circuit recently noted that a detainee’s acts were “exercises in
democratic freedom.”377
Despite these origins, the Ninth Circuit has applied the exception in a regime-neutral fashion because it did not “believe it
appropriate to make qualitative judgments regarding a foreign
government or a struggle designed to alter that government.”378
Following this approach, courts consider whether a foreign government has charged a defendant with a crime that is “political
in nature.”379 This inquiry, in turn, examines whether there was
a “violent political disturbance or uprising” in the country and
whether the defendant’s role was “incidental” to the uprising.380
Thus, courts usually do not discriminate by regime types, only by
“political” acts.381

372

Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 782 (9th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 781.
374 Id. at 803–04.
375 Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Political Offense Exception to Extradition and Transnational Terrorists: Old Doctrine Reformulated and New Norms Created, 1 ASSOC.
STUDENT INT’L L. SOC’YS INT’L L.J. 1, 43 (1977).
376 In re Gonzalez, 217 F. Supp. 717, 721 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
377 Venckiene v. United States, 929 F.3d 843, 855 (7th Cir. 2019). However, the court
ultimately did not apply the political-offense exception.
378 Robinson, 783 F.2d at 804.
379 Venckiene, 929 F.3d at 855.
380 Id. at 854 (quoting Ordinola v. Hackman, 478 F.3d 588, 597 (4th Cir. 2007)).
381 See id. at 855–56.
373
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The political-offense exception counsels, then, that U.S.
courts can retain a doctrine of neutral applicability that nonetheless examines whether foreign governments are attempting to
abuse our legal processes for political reasons. That could be a
model for reforms in the dictator context, which I explore in
greater detail below.
***
In sum, even if U.S. courts are not obligated to follow an equaltreatment principle for foreign dictatorships, there is probably no
easy way for courts to administer a categorical antidictatorship
standard. Instead, it may be more feasible to focus on either the
types of claims dictators bring or the comity doctrines. Given
these preliminary conclusions, efforts to weaken foreign dictatorships face some problems. Below, I attempt to account for and resolve these problems.
IV. ANTIDICTATORSHIP PROPOSALS: ANTI-SLAPP AND OTHERS
In this Part, I provide an array of suggestions and changes to
U.S. law that may allow courts to refuse the benefit of international comity to most foreign dictators in an administrable way.
The goal here is to stay faithful to the requirements of U.S. law
but also to the principle that the judiciary should jealously guard
its jurisdiction and prevent dictators from taking advantage of
U.S. courts. What I provide here is somewhat preliminary and
focused on practical solutions. In the long run, courts can still explore reforms to these cases that draw on the fact that there is no
equal-treatment principle, perhaps as an antidictatorship principle that serves as a gap-filler in close cases.
In short, drawing on Part II’s argument that there is no obligation of equal treatment, I propose the following changes to the
relevant comity doctrines so that they can no longer benefit foreign dictatorships. To resolve the dictators-as-plaintiffs problem
(1) Congress should subject the privilege of bringing suit to the
robust procedural protections of a federal anti-SLAPP statute so
that defendants can quickly dismiss oppressive political claims.
To resolve the dictators-as-defendants problems, courts should
(2) reconsider or eliminate the act of state doctrine, (3) limit the
scope of foreign official immunity, and (4) interpret the FSIA exceptions as broadly as they are written, allowing more claims
against foreign dictators.
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A. A Legislative Solution: Anti-SLAPP for Sovereign Plaintiffs
and Their Proxies
The fundamental problem with the privilege of bringing suit
is that foreign dictators and their proxies can access our courts to
harass opponents: Cuba can enforce expropriations; Panamanian
and Venezuelan dictators can sue democratic challengers and
newspapers; the Chinese Communist Party, Erdoğan, and Putin
can file claims against dissidents; and Iran can pursue a variety
of objectives in our courts. These claims are often illegitimate
because they use judicial methods and manufactured claims to
exercise sovereign control beyond national borders, engage in harassment, and pursue purely political aims.382 But current tools,
like Rule 11 sanctions or abuse-of-process counterclaims, are insufficient to fend off such claims—their standards are too high,
they often come at too late a stage in a litigation, they force defendants to incur substantial legal costs, and they do not sufficiently penalize plaintiffs.383 Because these tools are part of the
judicial arsenal, they also lack the congressional and executive
imprimatur necessary for a situation in which foreign sovereigns
are involved. If it is unfeasible to deny foreign dictators access to
court, how can we limit these claims?
It turns out that state governments have developed strategies to address similar claims in the free speech context: antiSLAPP statutes. In the 1990s, a few scholars and legislators noticed a worrying trend of lawsuits against private individuals for
speaking out politically.384 In the most worrisome cases, large organizations seemed to be suing individuals for exercising their
freedom of speech in contexts like “testifying against real estate

382

This is analogous to what used to be known as “lawfare.”
See Ateş v. Gülen, No. 15-cv-2354, at *4 (M.D. Pa. June 29, 2016) (order denying
a motion for Rule 11 sanctions); Xinba Constr. Grp. Co. v. Jin Xu, No. ESX-L-2889-18,
2019 WL 5459816, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Sept. 20, 2019) (dismissing an abuseof-process counterclaim). Although state anti-SLAPP statutes already cover defamation
claims, courts have previously refused to apply them in federal court. See, e.g., Abbas v.
Foreign Pol’y Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1331–32 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Fridman v. Bean LLC,
No. 17-2041, 2019 WL 231751, at *2–3 (D.D.C. Jan. 14, 2019).
It bears noting that companies sometimes file RICO claims to block alleged fraudulent
claims. See Nora Freeman Engstrom, Retaliatory RICO and the Puzzle of Fraudulent
Claiming, 115 MICH. L. REV. 639, 666–68 (2017).
384 See Penelope Canan & George W. Pring, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 35 SOC. PROBS. 506, 508 (1988); Penelope Canan & George W. Pring, Studying
Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation: Mixing Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 385, 387 (1988). See generally George W. Pring, Intimidation Suits Against Citizens: A Risk for Public Policy Advocates, 7 NAT’L L.J. 16 (1985).
383
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development at a zoning hearing, complaining to a school board
about unfit teachers, or demonstrating peacefully for or against
government actions.”385 These strategic lawsuits against public
participation (so-called SLAPP claims) are fundamentally about
intimidating and imposing costs on defendants. Superficially, the
claims vary in their substance, dressed up as defamation, business torts, or civil rights suits.386 But the proliferation of SLAPP
claims presents a significant challenge to the First Amendment
and political speech. This is true even if plaintiffs lose most cases
because they impose significant litigation costs on defendants. As
Professor George Pring noted, “SLAPPs send a clear message:
that there is a ‘price’ for speaking out politically. The price is a
multimillion-dollar lawsuit and the expenses, lost resources, and
emotional stress such litigation brings.”387
The potential for SLAPP-related chilling effects forced state
legislatures into action. States like California, Washington, Oregon,
Texas, and Nevada quickly enacted anti-SLAPP statutes to provide a “quick and inexpensive” way for defendants to move to
dismiss claims before protracted litigation sets in.388 Most of the
statutes allow defendants to demonstrate that they are being
sued for “exercis[ing] . . . constitutional rights,” usually freedom
of speech, political participation, or petitioning.389 If defendants
meet this standard, they trigger an array of procedural protections and shift the burden to plaintiffs to prove that they will prevail on the merits.390 The statutes expedite judicial considerations
of anti-SLAPP motions (usually within thirty or sixty days), stay
all discovery, provide “attorney’s fees,” allow for immediate appeals, and even provide for penalties for filing the claims as well
as “any additional relief ‘to deter repetition of the conduct and
comparable conduct.’”391 And these statutes are widely used,

385 Laura Long, SLAPPing Around the First Amendment: An Analysis of Oklahoma’s
Anti-SLAPP Statute and Its Implications on the Right to Petition, 60 OKLA. L. REV. 419,
419 (2007) (citations omitted).
386 Id. at 420.
387 George W. Pring, SLAPPs: Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 7
PACE ENV’T L. REV. 3, 6 (1989).
388 Jerome I. Braun, California’s Anti-SLAPP Remedy After Eleven Years, 34
MCGEORGE L. REV. 731, 735, 760 (2003) (quoting Simmons v. Allstate Ins., 92 Cal. App. 4th
1068, 1073–74 (2001)). Thirty states now have some form of anti-SLAPP statute. See State
Anti-SLAPP Laws, PUB. PARTICIPATION PROJECT (2017), https://perma.cc/V7LH-BV6C.
389 Braun, supra note 388, at 732 n.9.
390 See Tom Wyrwich, A Cure for a “Public Concern”: Washington’s New Anti-SLAPP
Law, 86 WASH. L. REV. 663, 674 (2011).
391 Id. at 674 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.525(6)(a) (2011)).
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including in at least 300 to 450 filings per year in the state of California alone.392
Congress could enact a Foreign Sovereign Anti-SLAPP
Statute.393 This statute would mirror state anti-SLAPP statutes
and would allow defendants to demonstrate that a foreign government or its proxy has sued them for political purposes or for
exercising rights protected by the U.S. Constitution, either at
home or abroad. If defendants can prove this, the burden would
shift to plaintiffs to demonstrate they will prevail on the merits,
that they are not attempting to abuse the legal process, and,
in the case of individuals, that they are not a proxy for a foreign
dictatorship. In the meantime, anti-SLAPP procedural protections would kick in.
The statute must address two main definitional problems:
(1) what counts as a “political” lawsuit and (2) what counts as a
proxy of a foreign government. On the first question, the statute
can draw from current anti-SLAPP standards, the political exception to extradition, and the immigration law standards for political asylum. As discussed above, courts in the extradition context
consider whether a foreign government has charged a defendant
with a crime that is “political in nature.”394 “Pure” political offenses involve crimes “like treason, sedition, and espionage, acts
‘directed against the state but which contain[ ] none of the elements of ordinary crime.’”395 “Relative” political offenses involve
common crimes that are “so connected with a political act that the
entire offense is regarded as political.”396 This latter offense, in
turn, depends on the existence of a “political disturbance” and an
offense that was incidental to it.397 This standard is still overly
narrow and hinges on violent uprisings.
An even better model is the political-asylum standard, where
an applicant “must demonstrate that he faces persecution ‘on

392 See Thomas R. Burke, The Annual Roundup of California Anti-SLAPP Appellate
Decisions, DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP (Feb. 28, 2020), https://perma.cc/K8MR-6M53.
393 Such a statute would, in effect, be the civil equivalent to the political exception to
extradition discussed above. See supra note 371. A few groups, including the American
Bar Association, have proposed a federal anti-SLAPP for all claims. See, e.g., AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION RESOLUTION 115, at 4 (Aug. 6–7, 2012).
394 Venckiene v. United States, 929 F.3d 843, 855 (7th Cir. 2019).
395 Id. at 854 (alteration in original) (quoting Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 512 (7th
Cir. 1981)).
396 Id. at 854 (quoting Eain 641 F.2d at 512).
397 Id. at 854–56.
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account of . . . political opinion.’”398 Applicants satisfy this by
showing that a foreign government harmed them for holding a
political opinion, including by participating in “act[s] against
the government” or protests.399 And applicants only have to show
that holding a political opinion was “one central reason” for the
mistreatment or persecution.400 There are thousands of asylum
decisions expounding on this standard, showing that courts are
comfortable defining the existence of political acts and subsequent persecution.401
These doctrines and case law provide a good starting point
for a Foreign Sovereign Anti-SLAPP Statute. A pure political lawsuit in the United States would result when the defendant is
simultaneously sued civilly in U.S. courts and prosecuted abroad
for alleged crimes directed against the foreign state. But the statute should go much further. In dictatorships, political dissidents
can oppose the ruling regime through public acts that are closer
to the political asylum standard of persecution based on a political
opinion. Therefore, relative political lawsuits in the United States
would result when there is evidence that the defendant opposed
a foreign regime through a legitimate public act—an exercise of
free speech under the U.S. Constitution, including petitions,
peaceful protests, commercial decisions, or statements to local and
foreign press—and was thereafter sued in U.S. courts. Crucially,
just like in the asylum context, a defendant would only need to
show that a political opinion was “at least one central reason” for
the civil lawsuit in the United States.402 This standard would resolve the problem of proxy plaintiffs filing facially legitimate complaints that are also partially motivated by political persecution
abroad.403
The statute should also explicitly address the problem of
proxies suing to promote the interests of foreign governments.
The statute here can draw on analogous inquiries that courts conduct when they pierce the veil of corporate structures, determine

398 Kumar v. Sessions, 755 F. App’x 610, 611 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(42)(A)).
399 Zhiqiang Hu v. Holder, 652 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2011), abrogated by Garland
v. Ming Dai, 141 S. Ct. 1669 (2021).
400 Zhiqiang Hu, 652 F.3d at 1017.
401 Judith L. Wood & Federica Dell’Orto, The Right to Asylum, 43 L.A. LAW. 18, 20
(Mar. 2020) (discussing the political nature of asylum decisions).
402 Zhiqiang Hu, 652 F.3d at 1017.
403 See generally Changsha Metro Grp. Co. v. Peng Xueng, No. E072596, 2020 WL
2537521 (Cal. Ct. App. May 19, 2020).
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the real party in interest in a federal case, or scrutinize whether
a legal party is merely an agent for someone else.404 Defendants
would first have the burden to show that a foreign individual is
merely a proxy of a foreign government. The statute should err on
the side of a broad definition because even if it were overinclusive,
it would merely be raising the standards on innocent foreign
plaintiffs to file lawsuits in U.S. courts. So there should be a presumption that state-owned entities and government officials (current or former) are proxies of a foreign government, even if they
claim to be suing in their individual capacity. Same, too, for foreign
oligarchs closely linked to autocratic regimes. For entities that
appear independent, courts should focus on whether a foreign
country is the primary beneficiary of the lawsuit or exercises ultimate control over the plaintiff, lawyers, or the legal claim. If met,
the burden would shift to plaintiffs to prove otherwise by presenting evidence that they are not a proxy for a foreign government.
Congress should legislate a few other important additions to
the statute to adapt it to the foreign sovereign context. First, the
statute should explicitly disable the benefits provided by comity
doctrines like act of state. Without such a provision, foreign dictatorships could still enforce their objectives in U.S. court. Second, the statute should explicitly apply to extraterritorial conduct
in order to comport with recent case law.405 Third, Congress
should explore the possibility that if a foreign sovereign is found
to have abused access to U.S. courts to pursue political dissidents,
that regime might lose the privilege of bringing suit for a specified
period of time.
A Foreign Sovereign Anti-SLAPP Statute would prevent
many of the most egregious cases discussed above. It would have
stopped Castro’s case against the sugar company in Sabbatino,
China’s array of cases against corruption suspects, Turkey’s claim
against Gülen, Russia and Venezuela’s many claims against dissidents, and Noriega’s claims. Such a statute would be a boon for
democracy around the world.
But even if Congress does not adopt such a statute, courts
could still take smaller steps to move towards such an approach.
In the face of political lawsuits by foreign authoritarian governments or proxies, U.S. courts could use existing tools—from
404 See, e.g., 6A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1554 (3d ed. 2002) (describing how to raise an objection to plaintiff’s status
as the real party in interest).
405 See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 117 (2013).
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inherent authority, FNC motions, malicious-prosecution claims,
and abuse-of-process claims all the way to international comity
abstention—to avoid these cases.406 Courts should focus on the
problem of abuse of process and analogize to the political exception to extradition and political asylum.
B. Weaken the Act of State Doctrine
It is time to reconsider the act of state doctrine. Although
scholars have unsuccessfully advocated for an end to this doctrine,
the foreign dictatorship cases this Article presents offer a new,
compelling reason to weaken it: the doctrine unduly enables foreign dictatorships to enjoy asymmetrical benefits.407 The doctrine
operates as a choice-of-law rule, refusing to question foreigngovernment acts done within their own territory to avoid the danger of “inadvertently caus[ing] foreign policy tensions or crises by
offending other nations.”408 But there is no evidence that judging
foreign acts of state would cause international tensions, and, even
if there were some evidence, those costs should be weighed
against the benefits of a weaker rule. Judging acts of state may
promote U.S. interests like “protecting American citizens from
discrimination or preventing the loss of endangered species or
some other kind of serious environmental harm.”409 A blanket rule
probably does not get such a calculus right.
That is why the act of state doctrine has been under attack
for decades. In 1976, the State Department “strongly intimated
that the doctrine should be abolished.”410 Courts and Congress
have carved out a list of exceptions, including when acts are in
violation of international law, when the president makes a suggestion of waiver, and when an expropriation seems to apply extraterritorially.411 But these exceptions only emphasize problems
with the main doctrine. For example, courts have construed the
Hickenlooper Amendment narrowly, allowing the act of state doctrine to apply in cases that seem to contradict congressional intent.412 Or take, for instance, the Bernstein exception, which
406 See generally Maggie Gardner, Abstention at the Border, 105 VA. L. REV. 63 (2019)
(examining and critiquing “international comity abstention”).
407 See Harrison, supra note 23, at 564.
408 Posner & Sunstein, supra note 56, at 1184.
409 Id. at 1185.
410 Michael J. Bazyler, Abolishing the Act of State Doctrine, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 325,
343 (1986).
411 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2).
412 See Kim, supra note 369, at 318.
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provides that the president can ask the court to waive the doctrine
for any reason.413 But, as Justice William Douglas highlighted,
this exception itself renders the court “a mere errand boy for the
Executive Branch which may choose to pick some people’s chestnuts from the fire, but not others’.”414 In its most recent decision,
W. S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp.,415 the
Supreme Court attacked the foundations of the doctrine, significantly narrowing the power of lower courts to examine the foreignpolicy consequences of judging an act of state.416 Act of state is
thus already weaker than it used to be.
Scholars have highlighted a mountain of problems with the
doctrine and have suggested that the Supreme Court may wish to
weaken or eliminate it entirely.417 Decades ago, Professor Michael
Bazyler proposed to abolish the doctrine for a variety of reasons,
including its unclear foundations, confusing applicability, misuse
by courts trying to evade difficult cases, and abdication of the judicial power.418 Moreover, the doctrine may be responsible for
weakening important federal laws like “[t]he federal antitrust
and securities laws, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, and
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.”419 Professor Jack Goldsmith
claimed that Kirkpatrick and other decisions show that the Supreme
Court wants to severely limit—or eliminate—the act of state
doctrine or even the federal common law of foreign relations.420
Professor Zach Clopton has argued that act of state should be
pared back in the name of separation of powers because courts
should not be making this kind of judgment.421 Other scholars
have instead argued about the proper grounding of act of state,
either under the Constitution or as common law.422
Here is an additional reason to weaken the act of state
doctrine: it unduly benefits foreign dictatorships. Even on a theoretical basis, there is reason to doubt act of state’s current
413

See Bernstein, 210 F.2d at 376.
First Nat’l City Bank, 406 U.S. at 773 (Douglas, J., concurring).
415 493 U.S. 400 (1990).
416 See id. at 406.
417 See Clopton, supra note 299, at 45. But see generally Andrew D. Patterson, The Act
of State Doctrine Is Alive and Well: Why Critics of the Doctrine Are Wrong, 15 U.C. DAVIS
J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 111 (2008).
418 See Bazyler, supra note 410, at 343, 365–84.
419 Id. at 329.
420 See Goldsmith, supra note 38, at 1704.
421 See Clopton, supra note 299, at 45.
422 See generally Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Law of Nations as
Constitutional Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 729 (2012); Wuerth, supra note 235.
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formulation. By asking whether an adjudication is likely to impact or threaten relations with a foreign state, act of state already
privileges countries that are fickle in their foreign affairs. And it
is certainly true that, in its early years, act of state shielded Cuban expropriation orders, Libyan antitrust violations, oil disputes
with Middle Eastern monarchies, and other cases involving authoritarian governments.423 To be sure, courts could cite act of
state as an additional defense in cases that are decided on other
grounds. Nonetheless, the doctrine seems to provide additional
help in dictator cases.
As discussed above, in twenty-five recent cases, act of state
protected regimes in China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Venezuela,
Cuba, and Burma from liability in U.S. court. By definition, act of
state forces the dismissal of a case that would have otherwise
been proper under U.S. law.424 In doing so, it unnecessarily shields
foreign dictators from liability. It is quite possible that the situation is even worse than my survey of cases suggests, because act
of state may deter the filing of claims to begin with. Therefore, it
is hard to know how many cases against foreign dictators would
have been filed in U.S. court. It may be time for courts or Congress
to reconsider the act of state doctrine. Even if courts are wary of
abolishing it, the judiciary could, at the very least, recognize a
counterclaim exception to act of state.425
C. Limit the Scope of Foreign-Official Immunity
While international law imposes obligations in the context of
foreign-official immunity, U.S. courts have some room to limit it.
As a reminder, foreign-official immunity is governed by federal
common law (which can be informed by customary international
law). There are two relevant immunities: (1) status-based immunity provides absolute immunity for heads of state and diplomats while in office and (2) conduct-based immunity covers foreign officials (and ex-dictators) for acts performed in an official
capacity. While suits against sitting dictators will usually fall under the impregnable head-of-state immunity, there is room for
suits against other government officials and former heads of state
that have neither status- nor conduct-based immunity.

423 See Bazyler, supra note 410, at 346, 350–53, 392–94. Cuba benefited even after
the Hickenlooper Amendment (which itself has been severely limited).
424 See Harrison, supra note 23, at 517, 542–44, 551–52, 554–56.
425 I thank Curtis Bradley for this last suggestion.
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Specifically, some courts have recognized instances in which
immunity does not attach: acts not performed in an official capacity and acts in violation of jus cogens norms of international law.426
First, Samantar and its progeny have held that foreign officials
cannot benefit from immunity for acts done in their private
capacity. This holding could potentially make space for suits
against former dictators. But that could happen only if acts that
we traditionally attribute to the state—e.g., torture and human
rights violations—could be reconceptualized as acts that promote
an individual dictator’s rule. Relatedly, the Fourth Circuit held,
in Yousuf v. Samantar,427 that “under international and domestic
law, officials from other countries are not entitled to foreign official immunity for jus cogens violations, even if the acts were performed in the defendant’s official capacity.”428 Foreign officials engage in jus cogens violations through acts like “torture, genocide,
indiscriminate executions and prolonged arbitrary imprisonment.”429 These acts are, “by definition[,] . . . not officially authorized by the Sovereign” and, therefore, do not give rise to conductbased immunity.430 On remand from the Supreme Court, the
Fourth Circuit found that a Sudanese official was not immune
from suit in U.S. court.431 Importantly, the Fourth Circuit drew
directly from a British decision that had denied immunity to former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet for “directing widespread
torture.”432 Courts therefore have flexibility to determine when
foreign officials violate jus cogens and subsequently lose official
immunity. But this analysis looks at acts, not regime types.
Another wrinkle in this context is the role of executive suggestions of immunity. Courts have uniformly held that executive
suggestions of head-of-state immunity are dispositive.433

426

For a discussion of the circuit split on this issue, see supra note 236.
See Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 775 (4th Cir. 2012).
427 699 F.3d 763, 775 (4th Cir. 2012).
427 See Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 775 (4th Cir. 2012).
428 Id. at 777.
429 Id. at 775.
430 Id. at 776.
431 Id. at 777.
432 Samantar, 699 F.3d at 776 (citing R. v. Bartle, ex parte Pinochet (1999) 2 WLR
(HL) 827 (appeal taken from Eng.)). For another example of how a foreign court has dealt
with dictator cases, see generally Salvatore Zappalà, Do Heads of State in Office Enjoy
Immunity from Jurisdiction for International Crimes? The Ghaddafi Case Before the
French Cour de Cassation, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 595 (2002).
433 See, e.g., Plaintiffs A, B, C, D, E, F v. Jiang Zemin, 282 F. Supp. 2d 875, 879, 881
(N.D. Ill. 2003), aff’d sub nom. Wei Ye v. Jiang Zemin, 383 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 2004).
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However, there is some disagreement both over cases where the
executive does not suggest immunity and over the application of
conduct-based immunity. Some courts have refused to extend immunity when the executive does not intervene, holding that the
common law of foreign relations determines this question.434 That
is why in Kadic v. Karadžić,435 the Second Circuit refused to extend sovereign immunity to the Bosnian-Serb leader Karadžić.436
Similarly, courts have held that conduct-based immunity is governed by the common law and that even executive suggestions
of immunity in this context are not determinative but merely
persuasive.437
Working within these confines, courts can perhaps loosen up
claims against foreign dictators. As the Fourth Circuit noted in
Samantar, there is an “increasing trend in international law to
abrogate foreign official immunity for individuals who commit
acts, otherwise attributable to the State, that violate jus cogens
norms—i.e., they commit international crimes or human rights
violations.”438 Not only should courts embrace this trend, they can
even advance the scope of these claims by expanding the number
of acts that violate jus cogens norms. In other words, U.S. courts
could push the development of international law norms.439
D. Interpret the FSIA Exceptions Broadly
The hardest aspect of claims against foreign dictators is
that—other than the state-sponsored terrorism exception—the
FSIA does not draw distinctions among regimes. As a general
matter, there is no compelling reason to broadly weaken the FSIA,
and there is a risk that doing so would unleash frivolous claims
against foreign countries. But the FSIA does provide a series of exemptions, including for waivers, contractual or tortious activity,
acts connected with terrorism, expropriation, and violations of international law. It may be possible for courts to apply a plain-text
reading of these exceptions that would actually expand them,
allowing more claims against foreign autocrats. Moreover,

434

Yelin, supra note 235, at 995–96 (collecting cases).
70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
436 See id. at 236, 247.
437 See Samantar, 699 F.3d at 773.
438 Id. at 776.
439 See Buxbaum, supra note 11, at 699–702; Ingrid Wuerth, International Law in the
Post-human Rights Era, 96 TEX. L. REV. 279, 329–30, 337 (2017) (discussing how states’
compliance with international norms can reinforce those norms).
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expanding exceptions is not unprecedented—courts have previously extended the expropriations exception.440 One fix, for instance, would be to eliminate doctrines that limit FSIA exceptions
like the “entire tort” doctrine, which recently made a case against
Russia more difficult.441 Another straightforward change would
be for Congress to amend the statute to add a cyberattack exception.442 One limiting principle would be that further loosening of sovereign immunity rules may well violate customary
international law.443
One potential avenue is to expand the implicit waiver and
counterclaims exceptions. The FSIA provides in § 1605(a)(1) that
a “foreign state shall not be immune . . . in any case . . . in which
the foreign state has waived its immunity either explicitly or by
implication.”444 In the face of this broad language, however, courts
have been “reluctant to find implied waivers, requiring strong evidence of the foreign state’s intent.”445 It appears that courts have
found implied waivers only when “(1) a foreign state has agreed
to arbitration in another country, (2) a foreign state has agreed
that a contract is governed by the law of another foreign country,
or (3) a foreign state has filed a responsive pleading in a case
without raising the defense of sovereign immunity.”446 But there
is no reason why courts cannot return to a more common-sense
reading of the phrase “by implication” that would include other
types of waiver.
Moreover, the counterclaim exception in § 1607(b) also removes immunity with respect to any counterclaim “arising out of
the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
claim.”447 Again, the phrase “transaction and occurrence” is broad
and subject to courts’ interpretations, especially because the exception hinges on how courts read “subject matter.”
Combining the counterclaim and waiver exceptions, courts
may be able to find that foreign dictators waive immunity for any
claims related to cases in which they are plaintiffs. We could refer

440 See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 455, reporters’ n.6, at
368–70 (AM. L. INST. 2018). But the Supreme Court has limited this effort. See Federal
Republic of Germany v. Philipp, 141 S. Ct. 703, 712–13, 715 (2021).
441 See Wuerth, supra note 67.
442 See Kleiner & Wolosky, supra note 28.
443 I thank Curtis Bradley for this point.
444 28 U.S.C. § 1605.
445 Stewart, supra note 167, at 42.
446 Id. at 42–43.
447 28 U.S.C. § 1607(b).
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to this as “subject-matter waiver.” For example, if Cuba sues U.S.
companies to enforce expropriations stemming from a particular
executive order, courts may read that action as implicitly waiving
immunity for any claims against Cuba arising out of the same
executive order. This would operate as a waiver of all claims arising out of the same subject matter and would draw from both
the implicit waiver and counterclaims exceptions. Similarly, if
Venezuelan officials sue the Wall Street Journal in U.S. court,
courts may read that as waiving sovereign immunity for cases
arising out of journalistic activities in Venezuela. Such an approach
would end the strange asymmetry that I discussed above. To be
sure, these subject-matter waivers may also be difficult to administer. For example, counterclaim waiver is typically specific to any
claims by the defendants. Here, however, it would allow third parties to file separate claims. Although problems could arise, this
option is worth further exploration.
Another potential avenue is to explore existing limits to the
expropriation exception to the FSIA. Section 1605(a)(3) provides
an exception to FSIA immunity in any case “in which rights in
property taken in violation of international law are in issue.”448
The Supreme Court recently interpreted this exception narrowly.449 But more than one dictatorship has avoided this exception by arguing that it does not “reach takings by a foreign government of its own nationals’ property.”450 Just like the act of state
doctrine, this court-created exception to the exception makes no
sense and disproportionately advantages dictatorships. If those
cases do not belong in U.S. court, they can be dismissed on
grounds other than sovereign immunity.451 Congress could amend
the FSIA to reverse Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp452 or,
more broadly, to add a human rights exception.

448

28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3).
See Philipp, 141 S. Ct. at 712–13, 715.
450 Stewart, supra note 167, at 56 (first citing Beg v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan,
353 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2003); then citing Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina,
965 F.2d 699, 711 (9th Cir. 1992); and then citing de Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicar.,
770 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1985)).
451 See also Philipp v. Federal Republic of Germany, 248 F. Supp. 3d 59, 67–69 (D.D.C.
2017), aff’d and remanded, 894 F.3d 406 (D.C. Cir. 2018), vacated and remanded, 141 S.
Ct. 703 (2021).
452 141 S. Ct. 703 (2021).
449
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***
These four potential solutions present only a preliminary
sketch aimed at a general suggestion: Congress and courts can
both make small corrections to current comity doctrines to prevent foreign dictators from taking advantage of our courts.
CONCLUSION
Foreign dictators (or monarchs) have been litigants in our
courts since the beginning of the republic. But there is no need to
grant them comity or the current level of access to court. Foreign
dictators have no right to benefit from comity doctrines that were
designed in a different time and place. Doctrines like act of state,
the privilege of bringing suit, or official immunity can adapt to a
modern world that is under threat from democratic regression.
U.S. courts and Congress should take up the baton and, in a careful and targeted way, recalibrate comity in these cases.
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Republic of
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F. Supp. 483
(S.D.N.Y.
1988)
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conductor,
Inc. v.
Electronum,
629 F. Supp.
903 (S.D.N.Y.
1986)
Republic of
Philippines Marcos
Philippines v.
Marcos, 806
F.2d 344 (2d
Cir. 1986)
Lary v.
Cuba
Castro
Republic of
Cuba, 643 F.
Supp. 194
(S.D.N.Y.
1986)
Est. of DoPhilippines Marcos
mingo v.
Marcos, 1983
WL 482332
(W.D. Wash.
1983)
S & S Mach.
Romania Ceaușescu
Co. v.
Masinexportimport, 706
F.2d 411 (2d
Cir. 1983)
Empresa
Cuba
Castro
Cubana
Exportadora
De Azucar
y Sus
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Lamborn &
Co., 652 F.2d
231 (2d Cir.
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Cuba
Castro
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Supp. 459
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Supp. 383
(S.D.N.Y.
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In re Saddam
Iraq
Hussein
Hussein, 468
F. Supp. 2d
126 (D.D.C.
2006)
Am. Bell Int’l,
Iran
Khomenei
Inc. v. Islamic
Republic of
Iran, 474 F.
Supp. 420
(S.D.N.Y.
1979)
Republic of
Panama
Noriega
Panama v.
Republic
Nat’l Bank of
N.Y., 681 F.
Supp. 1066
(S.D.N.Y.
1988)
Rovin
Romania Ceaușescu
Sales Co. v.
Socialist
Republic of
Romania, 403
F. Supp. 1298
(N.D. Ill.
1975)
Aerotrade,
Haiti
Francois
Inc. v.
Duvalier
Republic of
Haiti, 376 F.
Supp. 1281
(S.D.N.Y.
1974)
Aerotrade,
Haiti
Francois
Inc. v.
Duvalier
Banque
Nationale
De La
Republique
D’Haiti, 376
F. Supp. 1286
(S.D.N.Y.
1974)
Republic of
Panama
Torrijos
Panama v.
Citizens & S.
Int’l Bank,
682 F. Supp.
1544 (S.D.
Fla. 1988)
Heaney v.
Kingdom of Franco
Gov’t of
Spain
Spain, 445
F.2d 501 (2d
Cir. 1971)
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(S.D.N.Y.
1969)
World
Iran
Mohamed Dictator (Family)
Athletics
Reza
Sports Corp.
Shah
v. Pahlavi,
267 F. Supp.
160 (S.D.N.Y.
1966)
Republic of
Panama
Noriega
Sovereign
Panama v.
Air Pan.
Internacional,
S.A., 745 F.
Supp. 669
(S.D. Fla.
1988)
Republic
Philippines Marcos
Sovereign
of the
Philippines v.
Pfizer, 1981
WL 380666
(E.D. Pa.
1981)
Egiazaryan v.
Russia
Putin
Proxy
Zalmayev,
2011 WL
6097136
(S.D.N.Y.
2011)
Jiménez v.
Venezuela Maduro
SOE
Palacios,
2019 WL
3526479 (Del.
Ch. 2019)
LaTele
Venezuela Maduro
SOE
Television,
C.A. v.
Telemundo
Commc’ns
Grp., LLC,
2016 WL
6471201
(11th Cir.
2016)
Rich v.
Cuba
Castro
Sovereign
Naviera
Vacuba, S.A.,
295 F.2d 24
(4th Cir.
1961)
Pons v.
Cuba
Castro
Sovereign
Republic of

Defendant

243
Contract

L

Defendant

Judgment W
Enforcement

Plaintiff

Dispute over W
Sovereign
Funds

Plaintiff

Other

L

Plaintiff

Proxy Claim

L

Plaintiff

Other

L

Plaintiff

Other

L

Defendant

Contract

W

Defendant

Tort

W

244

The University of Chicago Law Review

Cuba, 294
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2017 WL
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2017)
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Republica de
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105 F. Supp.
272 (S.D.N.Y.
1952)
Qatar v. First
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Hamad
2020 WL
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(S.D.N.Y.
2020)
Complaint,
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Ltd. v.
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APPENDIX B: COLLECTED ACT OF STATE CASES AFTER
KIRKPATRICK
Case

Sovereign

Act of State
Holding
Applied?
Yes
Holding that act of state doctrine
barred investor action against
Canadian mining company for failure to disclose financial information
to a Mexican tax authority
Yes
Holding that act of state doctrine
barred antitrust claim rooted in competitors’ agreements with the provincial government of Ontario, Canada

Royal Wulff Ventures
LLC v. Primero Mining
Corp., 938 F.3d 1085
(9th Cir. 2019)

Mexico

Mountain Cres SRL,
LLC v. Anheuser-Busch
InBev, 937 F.3d 1067
(7th Cir. 2019)

Canada

Micula v. Gov’t of Rom.,
404 F. Supp. 3d 265
(D.D.C. 2019)

Romania

No

Arias Leiva v. Warden,
928 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir.
2019)

Colombia

No

Dismissing argument that act of
state doctrine barred confirmation of
arbitration award entered in favor of
Swedish nationals against Romania
Ruling that act of state doctrine did
not bar extradition of former
Colombian agriculture minister on
embezzlement charges
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Kashef v. BNP Paribas
S.A., 925 F.3d 53 (2d Cir.
2019)

Sudan

No

PDVSA U.S. Litig. Tr. v. Venezuela
Lukoil Pan Ams. LLC,
372 F. Supp. 3d 1353
(S.D. Fla. 2019)

No

Sea Breeze Salt, Inc. v.
Mitsubishi Corp., 899
F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2018)

Mexico

Yes

Von Saher v. Norton
Simon Museum of Art at
Pasadena, 897 F.3d 1141
(9th Cir. 2018)

Netherlands

Yes

Dist. Att’y of N.Y Cnty. Philippines
v. Republic of the
Philippines, 307 F. Supp.
3d 171 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)

No

Nnaka v. Federal
Republic of Nigeria, 238
F. Supp. 3d 17 (D.D.C.
2017)

Nigeria

Yes

Israel

No

Kuwait Pearls Catering
Co., WLL v. Kellogg
Brown & Root Servs.,
Inc., 853 F.3d 173 (5th
Cir. 2017)

Iraq

No

MMA Consultants 1, Inc.
v. Republic of Peru, 245
F. Supp. 3d 486
(S.D.N.Y. 2017)

Peru

No

Geophysical Serv., Inc. v.
TGS-NOPEC
Geophysical Co., 850
F.3d 785 (5th Cir. 2017)

Canada

No

Al-Tamimi v. Adelson,
264 F. Supp. 3d 69
(D.D.C. 2017)
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Holding that act of state doctrine did
not bar lawsuit by victims of alleged
Sudanese atrocities against a French
bank that allegedly circumvented
U.S. sanctions on Sudan
Dismissing action between Venezuelan
state-owned energy company’s U.S.based litigation trust and Russian oil
company for lack of standing, while
acknowledging that Venezuelan
court’s conclusion that the trust
agreement was unconstitutional
would also justify dismissal under
act of state doctrine
Barring an antitrust action against a
partially state-owned Mexican salt
production corporation, because its
decision to deal exclusively with a
Japanese corporation was an act of
state
Holding that act of state doctrine
barred Dutch art dealer’s heir’s
claim against art museum to recover
paintings taken by Nazis in forced
sale
Refusing to apply act of state doctrine to dismiss an interpleader action involving property misappropriated by the wife of the former
president of the Philippines
Ruling that various actions of
Nigerian Attorney General were acts
of state for the purposes of an attorney’s breach of contract and tort
claims against Nigeria
Concluding that act of state doctrine
did not bar Palestinian claims
against parties that allegedly
financed violent torts committed by
Israeli soldiers and settlers (Reversed on other grounds on appeal)
Holding that act of state doctrine did
not bar subcontractor’s breach of
contract claim against a general contractor, where general contractor asserted that subcontractor’s work belonged to the Iraqi government
Ruling that act of state doctrine did
not bar bondholders’ breach of contract action against Peru
Holding that act of state doctrine
does not “[forbid] a United States
court from considering the applicability of copyright’s first sale doctrine
to foreign-made copies when the
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foreign copier was a government
agency”
United States v. Sum of
$70,990,605, 234 F.
Supp. 3d 212 (D.D.C.
2017)

Afghanistan

No

In re Vitamin C
Antitrust Litig., 837 F.3d
175 (2d Cir. 2016)

China

Yes

Fed. Treasury Enter.
Sojuzplodoimport v.
Spirits Int’l B.V., 809
F.3d 737 (2d Cir. 2016)

Russia

Yes

Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Venezuela
Petróleos de Venezuela,
S.A., 213 F. Supp. 3d 683
(D. Del. 2016)

No

Villoldo v. Castro Ruz,
821 F.3d 196 (1st Cir.
2016)

No

Cuba

Hourani v. Mirtchev, 796 KazakhF.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
stan

Yes

Mezerhane v. Republica Venezuela
Bolivariana de
Venezuela, 785 F.3d 545
(11th Cir. 2015)

Yes

Du Daobin v. Cisco Sys.,
Inc., 2 F. Supp. 3d 717
(D. Md 2014)

China

Yes

Jovic v. L-3 Servs., Inc.,
69 F. Supp. 3d 750 (N.D.
Ill. 2014)

Croatia

No

Refusing to apply act of state doctrine to bar in rem action seeking
forfeiture of U.S.-based assets held
by three foreign banks, including the
Afghanistan International Bank
Ruling that act of state doctrine
barred inquiry into Chinese government’s motives for regulating its
domestic Vitamin C market.
(Reversed on other grounds by
Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. Hebei
Welcome Pharmaceuticals Co., 138
S. Ct. 1865 (2018))
Holding that act of state doctrine
prevented district court from adjudicating validity of Russian Federation
decree authorizing transfer of ownership rights in trademarks
Holding that act of state doctrine
did not bar Delaware Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act (DUFTA)
claims brought by Venezuelan creditor against state-owned Venezuelan
company and its subsidiaries. (Reversed on other grounds on appeal)
Holding that the extraterritorial exception to act of state doctrine precluded attachment of U.S.-based
securities accounts opened before
Cuban government passed
confiscatory law
Holding that act of state doctrine
barred a defamation action brought
by Kazakh businessmen against U.S.
consulting firm for statements appearing on the website of the Kazakh
Embassy in the United States
Ruling that act of state doctrine
barred Venezuelan citizen’s tort
claims against the Venezuelan
government for expropriation of
property
Holding that act of state doctrine
barred Chinese dissidents’ action
against computer hardware provider
that allegedly supported China’s
nationwide surveillance program
Holding that there was insufficient
information to apply act of state
doctrine to civil conspiracy claims
brought by Serbian survivors of the
Bosnian War against a U.S.-based
private military contractor
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Warfaa v. Ali, 33 F.
Supp. 3d 653 (E.D. Va.
2014)

Somalia
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No

Holding that act of state doctrine did
not bar TVPA claims against Somali
officials for acts that allegedly
violated jus cogens norms

Kaplan v. Cent. Bank of
Israel
Islamic Republic of Iran,
961 F. Supp. 2d 185
(D.D.C. 2013)
DRFP, LLC v. Republica Venezuela
Bolivariana de
Venezuela, 945 F. Supp.
2d 890 (S.D. Ohio 2013)
de Csepel v. Republic of
Hungary
Hungary, 714 F.3d 591
(D.D.C. 2013)

No

U.S. v. One Gulfstream Equatorial
G-V Jet Aircraft, 941 F.
Guinea
Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013)

No

Republic of Iraq v. ABB
AG, 920 F. Supp. 2d 517
(S.D.N.Y. 2013)

Iraq

No

Holding that act of state doctrine did
not bar actions against two banks
under the terrorism exception of the
FSIA
Holding that the of state doctrine did
not bar state law claim against
Venezuela for failure to pay two
promissory notes
Ruling that act of state doctrine did
not bar breach of contract actions
against Hungary to require return of
expropriated artwork
Holding that act of state doctrine did
not bar U.S. government’s forfeiture
action against jet plane owned by
son of president of Equatorial
Guinea
Holding that act of state doctrine did
not apply in action between Iraq and
businesses that had provided services to Hussein regime

Konowaloff v. Metro.
Museum of Art, 702 F.3d
140 (2d Cir. 2012)

Russia/
USSR

Yes

Garcia v. Chapman, 911
F. Supp. 2d 1222 (S.D.
Fla. 2012)

Cuba

No

McKesson Corp. v.
Islamic Republic of
Iran, 672 F.3d 1066
(D.D.C. 2012)

Iran

No

In re Fresh and Process
Potatoes Antitrust Litig.,
834 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (D.
Idaho 2011)

Canada

Yes

Spectrum Stores, Inc. v.
Citgo Petroleum Corp.,
632 F.3d 938
(5th Cir. 2011)

OPEC

Yes

Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, Papua New
671 F.3d 736
Guinea
(9th Cir. 2011)

No

No

No

Ruling that U.S. recognition of the
Soviet government barred action by
Russian national to recover painting
removed from private collection,
placed in state-run Russian
museum, and then sold to U.S.-based
museum
Holding that act of state doctrine did
not bar TPVA and ATS claims
brought against the Cuban government, because alleged crimes
violated jus cogens norms
Ruling that act of state doctrine did
not bar U.S. corporation’s claim
against Iran for expropriating the
corporation’s equity interest in
Iranian dairy
Ruling that act of state doctrine
barred potato purchasers’ antitrust
claims against Canadian potato
growers’ cooperative
Holding that act of state doctrine
barred U.S. gasoline retailers’ claims
against OPEC nations for their
methods of distributing and pricing
oil and petroleum products
Holding that jus cogens norms are
exempt from the act of the state
doctrine
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Belarus

No

Refusing to apply act of state doctrine in antitrust litigation involving
Belarusian potash

In re Refined Petroleum
Prods., 649 F. Supp. 2d
572 (S.D. Tex. 2009)

Venezuela

Yes

U.S. v. Portrait of Wally,
663 F. Supp. 2d 232
(S.D.N.Y. 2009)

Austria

No

Philippines

No

Lizarbe v. Rondon, 642
F. Supp. 2d 473 (D. Md.
2009)

Peru

No

Ruling that act of state doctrine
barred antitrust suit against
Venezuelan oil company for entering
into an agreement with OPEC
member nations
Holding that act of state doctrine did
not bar U.S. government’s forfeiture
proceedings involving a painting,
which was taken from rightful owner
in Austria by Nazis, acquired postwar by Austrian museum, and imported into United States by New
York gallery
Holding that act of state doctrine did
not bar a Philippine province’s
claims against a gold mining company when those claims referenced
alleged complicity of Philippine
government
Holding that act of state doctrine did
not bar TPVA and ATS claims
against Peruvian military officers

U.S. v. Lazarenko, 504
F. Supp. 2d 791 (N.D.
Cal. 2007)

Antigua

No

Ruling that act of state doctrine did
not bar criminal forfeiture action
against funds held by Antiguan bank

Malewicz v. City of Amsterdam, 517 F. Supp. 2d
322 (D.D.C. 2007)
Glen v. Club
Mediterranee, S.A.,
450 F.3d 1251
(11th Cir. 2006)

Netherlands

No

Cuba

Yes

Gov’t of Dom. Rep. v.
AES Corp, 466 F. Supp.
2d 680 (E.D. Va. 2006)

Dominican
Republic

No

Norwood v. Raytheon
Co., 455 F. Supp. 2d 597
(W.D. Tex. 2006)

Germany

No

Gross v. German Found.
Indus. Initiative, 456
F.3d 363 (3d Cir. 2006)

Germany

No

Ruling that act of state doctrine did
not bar expropriation claim against
public Amsterdam art museum
Ruling that act of state doctrine precluded jurisdiction over trespass and
unjust enrichment claims brought by
purported owners of property that
had been confiscated by Cuban
government
Ruling that act of state doctrine did
not apply to Dominican Republic’s
lawsuit against several U.S. companies for coal ash dumping
Refusing to apply act of state doctrine to tort claims by members of
German military against U.S.
military contractors
Holding that act of state doctrine did
not bar claims against German businesses that allegedly benefitted from
wartime slave labor

Israel

Yes

Provincial Gov’t of
Marinduque v. Placer
Dome, Inc., 582 F.3d
1083 (9th Cir. 2009)

Doe I v. State of Israel,
400 F. Supp. 2d 86
(D.D.C. 2005)

Applying act of state doctrine to preclude jurisdiction over Palestinian
expropriation claims against government of Israel
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In re Philippine Nat’l
Philippines
Bank, 397 F.3d 768 (9th
Cir. 2005)

Yes

Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381
F. Supp. 2d 1164 (C.D.
Cal. 2005)

Colombia

No

Cruz v. U.S., 387 F.
Supp. 2d 1057 (N.D. Cal.
2005)

Mexico

No

Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 374 F. Supp. 2d 1
(D.D.C. 2005)
Doe v. Qi, 349 F. Supp.
2d 1258 (N.D. Cal. 2004)

Sudan

No

China

Yes

Abu Ali v. Ashcroft, 350
F. Supp. 2d 28
(D.D.C. 2004)

Saudi
Arabia

No

Kazakhstan

No

U.S. v. Giffen, 326 F.
Supp. 2d 497
(S.D.N.Y. 2004)

U.S. v. Labs of Virginia, Indonesia
Inc., 272 F. Supp. 2d 764
(N.D. Ill. 2003)

No

World Wide Mins.,
Ltd. v. Republic of
Kazakhstan, 296 F.3d
1154 (D.C. Cir. 2002)

Kazakhstan

Yes

Fogade v. ENB
Revocable Tr., 263 F.3d
1274 (11th Cir. 2001)

Venezuela

No

Daliberti v. Republic of
Iraq, 97 F. Supp. 2d 38
(D.D.C. 2000)

Iraq

No
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Holding that act of state doctrine invalidated a district court contempt
order against a Philippine bank that
refused to transfer funds to the Philippine government despite an order
from that country’s highest court
Ruling that act of state doctrine did
not bar ATS/TVPA action against oil
company and private security firm
for involvement in bombing of village
by Colombian military
Permitting action against Mexican
government to recover funds held on
behalf of Mexican nationals for work
performed in United States during
and after World War II
Ruling that act of state doctrine did
not bar suit against Sudan brought
under terrorism exception to FSIA
Holding that act of state doctrine
barred claims for human rights violations committed by Chinese government against Falun Gong
practitioners
Ruling that act of state doctrine did
not bar adjudication of habeas petition brought by U.S. citizen challenging detention in Saudi prison, allegedly at the behest of the United
States
Refusing to apply act of state doctrine to bar prosecution of U.S. corporate executive for bribing Kazakh
officials
Declining to apply act of state doctrine to bar prosecution of defendants for importing macaque monkeys
protected by Indonesian law, even
though the monkeys were allegedly
exported by bribing Indonesian
officials
Applying act of state doctrine to bar
breach of contract claim by Canadian
corporation against Kazakhstan for
failure to issue a uranium export
permit
Holding that Second Hickenlooper
Amendment did not preclude
applying act of state doctrine to
Venezuela’s receivership of a
Venezuelan corporation
Ruling that act of state doctrine did
not require dismissal of action
brought by United States citizens
against government of Iraq, seeking
damages for acts of torture and hostage taking
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Roe v. Unocal Corp., 70
F. Supp. 2d 1073 (C.D.
Cal. 1999)

Burma

Yes

Riggs Nat’l Corp. &
Subsidiaries v. C.I.R.,
163 F.3d 1363 (D.C. Cir.
1999)

Brazil

Yes

Virtual Def. & Dev. Int’l,
Inc. v. Republic of
Moldova, 133 F. Supp.
2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999)

Moldova

No

Credit Suisse v. U.S.
Dist. Ct. for Cent. Dist.
of Cal., 130 F.3d 1342
(9th Cir. 1997)

Switzerland

Yes

Sampson v. Federal
Republic of Germany,
975 F. Supp. 1108 (N.D.
Ill. 1997)

Germany

Yes

Nat’l Coal. Gov’t of
Union of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329
(C.D. Cal. 1997)

Burma

No

Hargrove v.
Underwriters at Lloyd’s,
London, 937 F. Supp.
595 (S.D. Tex. 1996)

Colombia

Yes

First Am. Corp. v.
United
Al-Nahyan, 948 F. Supp.
Arab
1107 (D.D.C. 1996)
Emirates

No

Pravin Banker Assocs.,
Ltd. v. Banco Popular
del Peru, 895 F. Supp.
660 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
Shen v. Japan Airlines,
918 F. Supp. 686
(S.D.N.Y. 1994)

Peru

No

Japan

Yes

United
Kingdom

No

Virgin Atl. Airways Ltd.
v. British Airways PLC,
872 F. Supp. 52
(S.D.N.Y. 1994)
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Holding that act of state doctrine
precluded review of Burmese officer’s
order to his soldiers to dig drainage
ditch for gas pipeline constructed by
U.S. corporation
Holding that act of state doctrine
made binding a ruling by the
Brazilian Minister of Finance on
whether an U.S. bank was entitled to
tax credits from the Brazilian
government
Holding that act of state doctrine did
not bar U.S. consulting firm’s contract action seeking commission for
allegedly brokering weapons sale between Moldova and U.S.
Holding that Swiss executive and
cantonal orders freezing assets of
family of deceased former head of
state were sufficient to trigger act of
state doctrine
Ruling that act of state doctrine
barred claims by Holocaust survivor
seeking additional reparations from
Germany and Conference on Jewish
Material Claims Against Germany
Concluding that act of state doctrine
did not bar tort claims brought by
Burmese refugee and Burmese labor
organization against U.S. oil company which had entered into joint
venture with Burmese government
Ruling that act of state doctrine
barred claims by family against employer and insurer stemming from
their failure to secure the release of
employee held by Colombian
guerrillas
Holding that act of state doctrine did
not immunize Emirati officials and
their personal holding companies in
action claiming officials had attempted to secretly take over banks
Ruling that act of state doctrine did
not apply to action by U.S. creditor
challenging Peru’s suspension of
commercial bank debt
Ruling that act of state doctrine
barred lawsuit by passengers against
Japanese public airline for wrongful
detention, torture, and deportation
Refusing to apply act of state
doctrine to airline’s action against
formerly state-owned competitor for
alleged anticompetitive conduct
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The University of Chicago Law Review

Grupo Protexa, S.A. v.
All Am. Marine Slip, 20
F.3d 1224 (3d Cir. 1994)

Mexico

[89:1

No

Holding that act of state doctrine did
not bar review of captain’s order requiring removal of sunken vessel
from offshore oil field within
Mexico’s Exclusive Economic Zone

U.S. v. Funmaker, 10
Winnebago
F.3d 1327 (7th Cir. 1993)
Tribe

No

Declining to apply act of state doctrine to prosecution of tribal member
who burned down tribe’s bingo hall
pursuant to orders from tribal
officials

Eckert Int’l, Inc. v. Gov’t
of Sovereign Democratic
Republic of Fiji, 834 F.
Supp. 167
(E.D. Va. 1993)

Fiji

No

Holding that act of state doctrine did
not bar action against Fiji for breach
of contract for lobbying services

Optopics Lab’ys Corp. v.
Savannah Bank of
Nigeria, Ltd.,
816 F. Supp. 898
(S.D.N.Y. 1993)

Nigeria

No

Holding that act of state doctrine did
not bar U.S. corporation’s action
against a Nigerian bank, even
though Nigeria’s exchange control
regulations allegedly prevented bank
from paying corporation

In re Am. Cont’l Co./
Lincoln Sav. & Loan Sec.
Litig., 794 F. Supp. 1424
(D. Ariz., 1993)

France

No

Ruling that act of state doctrine did
not apply to fraud claims against
bank that had been restructured under to French law

No

Holding that act of state doctrine did
not bar breach of contract claim
between U.S. corporation and
Philippine Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG)

Walter Fuller Aircraft
Philippines
Sales, Inc. v. Republic of
the Philippines, 965 F.2d
1375 (5th Cir., 1992)

